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PREFACE
The continued outpouring of scholarly work on
fascism, an interest which began with fascism’s very
inception as an ideological construct and which con-
tinued through the realization that fascism was a
viable political system, demonstrates not only the
appeal that the study of fascism holds for the intellect-
ual community but also testifies to its disruptive
forces and inexplicable, almost magnetic character.
This thesis is but another piece of research
and reflection that may be added to an already abun-
dant body of literature on fascism; however, no specific
justification is required for writing on a subject
so well studied and analyzed since questions still
remain unanswered concerning the nature and origins
of the "philosophy"
.
Furthermore, although the
threat of fascism under the banner of Hitler or Mussolini
has been uprooted from the world, the collapse of the
ix
inter-war regimes did not remove those aspirations and
beliefs from which contemporary reactionary dictator-
ships may draw their impetus and support. Thus, fas-
cism must be studied until its very essence and origins
are more clearly understood.
Taking the works on fascism as a whole, there
appear to be some principal categories of investigation
(i.e. approaches), beyond the study of particular
regimes, to which most writers in a certain period
address themselves and which have contributed to an
understanding of fascism. It is with these avenues
of inquiry, three in number, which these thesis is
primarily concerned i fascism viewed as the end of
liberalism, fascism viewed as totalitarianism, fas-
cism viewed as a revolt against modernization. All
three perspectives were popular at a particular stage
of fascism's development and all three are encompassed
by almost every work thus written.
However, this thesis goes beyond merely providing
the reader with an historical analysis of the literature
on fascism by showing why a certain view predominated
at one point in time while another was adhered to by
most writers several years later, and by illustrating
the intertwining of the historical analysis with the
relevant facts on fascism. In brief, the scope of
Xthis thesis is both historical and analytical! histor—
ical in the fact that it reviews the literature on
fascism, analytical in that it analyzes these perspec-
tives not only in relation to the events of the time
in which a specific view received majority support
by the academic community, but also their validity in
terms of the actual reality of and ideological compon-
ents of fascism.
INTRODUCTI ON
"Fascism," an historian has written, "came as a
•i
surprise to all and to themselves too." Not a single
prophet during more than a century of ideological spec-
ulation ever imagined any movement like fascism. There
was, in the prophecies of the future, communism and
capitalism and modifications thereof; there was liberal-
ism and despotism and even anarchism; conflict, concord,
European unity, church power; still there was no fascism.
It was the great political shock of the twentieth century
Today, fascism of the inter-war period remains one
of the most perplexing and difficult problems to analyze.
No movement has ever touched so many so violently and yet
accomplished so little after causing so much devastation.
Fascism raged and stormed and threw the entire world into
an era of chaos—then there was nothing left, neither
the leaders with their doctrines and their pride, nor
the people with their passions and their fears.
The underlying premise of this thisis is founded
on the belief that the study of fascism must be tied to
2the history of the West’s development. As one author
puts it i "Fascism is as much an organic part of modern
Europe as liberalism or communism."^ Fascism can no
longer be dismissed as an expression of German or
Italian national character, nor as the alleged demonic
irrationalism of modern man, nor even as the psychopathic
tendency of a few powerful men. Rather, fascism must
be viewed as a true expression of western culture in
the inter-war period— "an emergence of traditions and
attitudes that have been nurtured in the innards of
European society."
Thus, in order to understand the true nature of
fascism, one has to view it in relation to the nature
of modern social development, of which it is merely a
reflection. Fascism should be treated not as an abber-
ation or accident in the West’s development, but as a
phenomenon that revealed something basic about European
society in the twentieth century.
It must not be forgotten that before the close of
the twenties, avowed fascist groups existed in every
western nation; and by the mid-thirties, it was not
altogether idle to ask the question: Would Europe be
all-fascist by the turn of the decade? An entire con-
tinent gone fascist seemed well within the realm of
possibilities even before Germany took its pre-eminent
3position among the fascist powers of the world. ^ Thus,
in much of the world and in all levels of society, there
was a wide disposition to look at fascism—at least to
see what it had to offer.
The most important state to follow the Italian
example was, of course, Germany, led by the National
Socialists. Other smaller powers intent on imitating
the fascist method included Spain, ruled by Franco,
the son of a monarchist dictator; Austria, where
Dollfuss subdued a powerful social democratic movement
and set up a neo-fascist regime in 193**; Rumania, on
the streets of which the Jews were harrassed and per-
secuted by the Iron Guard; Yugoslavia, led by Alexander,
dictator in the early thirties who used the communist
bogey to justify his abuses of power; and Hungary,
where the political parties that sprang up in the
thirties adopted the distinctive marks of Hungarian
National Socialism (the green shirt and the Arrow
Cross Badge). ^ Fascist parties, although weak, were
also present in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France.
Even England, the seat of parliamentary government and
liberal democracy, had its own brand of fascism, and
Ireland's government was increasingly menaced by
O'Duffy's Blue Shirts, a fascist offshoot of the
7
United Ireland Party/
4Thus, it appears that fascism cannot he understood
as a particular German or Italian manifestation; it was
continental in its pervasiveness. "Every nation contriv-
ed its own expression of the same phenomenon—different
in style, different in the personality of leadership,
hut alike in the common quality historians are wont to
call ’fascist
Furthermore, the pattern of interaction and cooper-
ation among the various parties which called themselves
fascist makes it possible to write about a European
fascism. For example, several days after Mussolini's
successful march on Rome, an associate of Hitler pro-
claimed* ,4 What has been done in Italy by a handful cf
courageous men is not impossible. In Bavaria too we
have Italy's Mussolini (sic). His name is Adolph
Hitler
. . .
..9 Just as Mussolini influenced Hitler,
so Hitler influenced the other fascist parties of the
1930 's
.
It was also part of the conviction of most of
the fascists themselves that they were not merely
part of a nationalistic movement, but were more import-
antly part of a European movement—one designed not
only to change their own society but the society of
the entire continent-- and therefore, they must cooperate
with and encourage one another. At a mass meeting in
Ludwigshafen on November 11
, 1936 , the Nazi minister
of propaganda proclaimed: "The Fiihrer today is not only
the leader of the German nation but the spiritual
'awakener' of Europe."* 0 On March 26, 1939, Hitler
sent a telegram to Mussolini. In it he stated:
On the occassion of the twentieth anniver-
sary of the foundation of the Fascist fight-
ing forces I think with cordial and faithful
friendship of you, the victorious creator of
the proud new Italy. Inspired by the same
ideals, the^ German people stands by the side
of the Italian people which has been tested
through conflict, both of us united in self-
defense against the manoeuvres of the hatred
and incomprehension whose aim it is to surpress
the legitimate desire to live of our two
peoples and to imperil the peace of the world, 11
Even the fascist doctrine itself purported to be
international rather than purely nationalistic in scope.
International solutions were proposed for inter-war
domestic problems and the slogan of a United Europe
proved to be the fascists' most successful propaganda
device. Although fascism may be said to lack a single
or common founder, throughout Europe it was born as a
result of a common set of grievances and proposed a
common solution to them. In fact, the fascist parties
separated themselves from the governmental apparatus
(in those countries in which they came to power) in the
hopes of appearing international rather than national-
istic and chauvinistic. Like communism, fascism was
a philosophy designed not merely to change one nation,
6but rather appeared as a dogma on which all of the new
Europe could be built.^
It is precisely because fascism must be viewed as
a European or international phenomenon while at the same
time recognizing that it is an experience made differ-
ent in each nation by its respective national and social
environment that makes an exact definition—one applicable
to all fascist groups in all nations--unsatisfactory
1 Zi>
and extremely general at best.
However, although varying circumstances in the
states in which fascism became popular produced a
variety of configurations of the same phenomenon, there
are characteristics common to all fascist movements.
Fascism rejects individualism and asserts that the only
purpose of man is to serve as an instrument for the
state’s ends? all values, consequently, are derived from
the state in which the individual possesses no rights.
Fascism repudiates equality and substitutes the principle
of hierarchy culminating in the supreme ruler whose
will is law. Fascism abhors the doctrine of pacifism
and regards international peace as neither desireable
or possible. Fascism is opposed to liberal western
man's attempt to be his own master? faith and emotion
are the qualities that make a good fascist citizen .
1
In essence, the fascist mentality may be summed
up by these four characteristics: "Racialism, Ethnocen-
7trism, Fuehrerism, and S tatism, Perhaps "the passion
as well as the philosophy behind the fascist ideology
can best be captured by these words written by Mussolini
(or purportedly by him) for the Enciclopedia Italians
The Fascist conception of life is a religious
one, in which man is viewed in his immanent
relation to a higher law, endowed with an
objective will transcending the individual
and raising him to conscious membership of
a spiritual society.
. . .
. . .
Thus understood, Fascism, is totali-
tarian and the Fascist State--a synthesis, and
a unit inclusive of all values—interprets,
develops, and potentiates the whole life
of a people, 18
Therefore, although it is tempting to conclude
that there really is no such thing as European fascism,
the origins, doctrines, and aims of the various movements
have much in common. In all of them, it can be observed
that the fascist trend generally followed similar lines?
and just as fascism "looked to a Europe of the future, so
its roots must be sought in the Europe of the past ... 7
This thesis, however, is concerned not only with
viewing fascism as a European experience, but also with
tracing the different perspectives on fascism in an histor-
ical context. In much the same way that European society
has changed in the twentieth century, so have the views
on fascism. Connections between the fascist system and
certain aspects of western civilization that were once
regarded as all-important, i.e, fascism’s intense hatred
8of liberalism, are often relegated to a different role
in contemporary literature.
Furthermore, as will be demonstrated by this thesis,
fascism
—
probably to a greater extent than any other
historical question—cannot be viewed objectively.
Changing the words "charred bodies" to "burnt corpses"
does not make the fascist atrocities any less real or
any less outrageous. The fact still stands that millions
of Jews and thousands of other enemies of fascism were
violently and barbarically murdered while most of the
governments of the world sat and watched. How can one
be objective when one is confronted with the mass pro-
duction of corpses? Perhaps the question of objectivity
is greater than this: not only can one not remain
objective, but one should not be objective. In essence,
one cannot afford to remain objective. Humanity demands
that euphemisms not be used to obfuscate the moral
obligations of humanity.
In any case, it is not in the realm of this thesis
to debate this perplexing question. However, the times
in which one writes will be shown to affect one’s per-
spective on the subject probably as much as one’s own
personal philosophy and beliefs. In brief, the scope of
this thesis v/ill be to examine fascism from a historical
and cross-national perspective.
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*^It is not the purpose of this thesis to attempt
a technical definition of the term fascism; nor is it
necessary for the reader to be familiar with the various
differences among the different fascist parties. Rather,
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the basic philosophy and spirit of the fascist trend
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*^Ten fundamental symptoms of Eurooean fascism
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to mystical concepts and a rejection of logical reason-
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Benito Mussolini, Mussolini *s Doctrines
(Firenze: Vallecchi, 1935)* pp. 12-14.
197Kedward, Fascism in Western Europ e, p, 5.
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CHAPTER I
FASCISM VIEWED AS THE END OF LIBERALISM
The first and probably least sophisticated argu-
ment concerning the development of fascist ideology may
be termed the "end of liberalism" view. It is an out-
look that prevailed in the twenties and thirties when
fascism had not yet completely developed. According to
this view, fascism was government by the irrational,
deceit for those who no longer wanted to know the truth,
violence to govern those who refused to believe, misguided
devotion of a people to an ideology that promised riches
but produced a living hell. In the works of these authors
(R. Palme Dutt, Erich Fromm, Peter F. Drucker) fascism
appears as a movement both opportunist and inhumane, a
force brutal in its methods and barbaric in its ideology,
a politics incomprehensible outside of the postwar Europ-
ean situation. In effect, fascism was seen as the collapse
of liberal man and with him, liberal society.
12
Comparison cf Tenets i Liberalism vs Fascism
Liberalism, as used here, refers to the "positive
attitudes toward progress, rationality, individuality,
and nationality,"^ From liberalism's very inception
which began with Rosseau's and Burke's philosophy of
natural rights, liberalism has stood for the limitation
of the ambit of political authority--the restricting
of governmental affairs within a framework of constitu-
tional principle; therefore, liberalism represents the
philosophy which espouses the view that every individual
has fundamental rights on which the state is not allowed
to transgress.
Liberalism is a set of beliefs that affects the
political, social, and economic structure of the state
and is based on the assumption that each citizen is en-
titled to as much freedom as possible within his civil
society. The liberal doctrine maintains that states
must respect the "claims of conscience" and "proceed by
p
rule rather than by discretion in their operations,"
The essence of this mode of political thought is that
the government exists to protect and to realize the
natural and inaliable rights of its citizens— the state's
functions are subordinated to the interests of the individ-
ual, rather than the individual's to those of the state.
The liberal's belief in the existence of natural
13
rights leads to the logical conclusion that man is a
rational being, capable of disciplining himself and
achieving his own moral progress for the good of society
as well as himself.
For fascists, liberalism is an avowed, and even
blatant enemy, with its hostility to the claims of
excessive state power, with its assertion that individual
man has rights which the state is not entitled to invade,
with its view of the state as an impartial judge and
not as a unifying force, with its naive ideals: toler-
ance, government by reason and reflection, liberty of
expression, conviction, and association. In sum, the
liberal conception of the state is essentially legal-
istic? it is the impartial, yet popularly based govern-
ing agency of an area established by the constitutional
and legal structure.
For fascists, the state is supreme—not the individ-
ual—not only because it makes coordinated and organized
rule possible, but because the state is a vital element
in every individual conscience and is therefore the
highest form of spiritual unity. Outside the state,
man is a non-entity. "Man is man only in so far as his
existence is an individualized concrete of the universal
spirit, the state. The state alone is the only vehicle
through which man may achieve the freedom necessary for
14
him to reach his own potential. Mussolini said:
Those who perceive nothing beyond the oppor-
tunistic considerations in the religious
policy of the Fascist regime fail to realise
that Fascism is not only a system of govern-
ment but also and above all a system of
thought.-?
and Hitler continued:
The state is a means to an end. Its ends
lie in the preservation and advancement of
a community of physically and psychically
homogeneous creatures. This preservation
itself comprises first of all existence as
a race and thereby permits the free develop-
ment of all forces dormant in this race. G
Because the state is the highest form of spiritual
expression, it must be considered all-powerful and there-
fore, its actions unquestionable. "Everything within
the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against
the State," was Mussolini's formula. ^ Thus, the fascist
conception of the state was all embracing. Given this
personification of the state as a living spiritual
being, none of its actions require justification; all
its practices and doctrines are moral because of the
state's own spiritual essence and personality.
Hence, the fascist nation is a spiritual entity
having a life in and of itself whose ends and means of
action are not only superior to those of the separate
individuals, but are also greater than the sum of its
Q
members who compose it. To the fascist, man has no
rights by virtue of his birth, no fundamental freedoms
15
whose whole purpose of the polity is to preserve and
foster; to the fascist, all privileges are derived from
the state and are therefore dependent on the state.
"First duty, then rights," is a much quoted Mussolini
aphorism.
Just as fascism is definitely and absolutely
opposed to the liberal doctrine of natural rights and
government for the individual, so does it attack the
liberal's belief in man's good sense and intelligence.
Fascism asserts the proposition that the great mass of
people are dominated by fundamental emotions and are
therefore unable to rule themselves wisely. That man
is irrational and selfish, and consequently unable to
sacrifice his individual interests for the mystical
nation-state is the fascist basis for its hostility to
popular, liberal government. Although reason and science
are admitted to be "the products of mankind," by the
fascists, they also believe that it is "chimerical to
seek reason directly for the people and through the
o
people
.
Whereas the driving force in liberal politics is
the interest of the individual while that of fascist
politics is in pursuit of the ends of the state, it is
likewise in liberal as opposed to fascist economic prin-
ciples. The nineteenth century liberal economic doctrine,
16
usually termed laissez faire, which postulates that
economics will progress correctly, i.e, for the benefit
of the individual as well as society, if it is not
restricted by governmental interference, was vehementlv
attacked by the fascists. It is the fascists’ conten-
tion that if individuals were left to their own accord
in the economic sphere, they would proceed so that their
own ends, and not the state's ends, would be satisfied.
(It is necessary to remember that the ends of the state
and those of its citizens are not necessarily the same.
"For Fascism," said Rocco, the philosopher and fascist
Minister of Justice under II Duce, "society the end,
individuals the means, and its whole life consists in
using individuals for its social ends."'*’ 0 ) Furthermore,
since devastating conditions of social life and economic
strife might endanger the state, these conditions must
not be permitted to develop. Only if the state assumes
all control over its citizens' economic practices can
it insure its own welfare.
Thus, in both the political and economic spheres,
fascism, in theory, is in dissent with liberal dogmas.
There can be no common ground between two such antagon-
istic Weltanschauungen. Liberalism negates the state
for the sake of the individual? fascism reasserts the
superiority of the state's rights as expressing the real
essence of the individual. The former holds that each
17
individual is capable of pursuing his own goals in all
realms of life for "the benefit; of himself as well as
that of the nation with only a minimal amount of govern-
mental interference and supervision; the latter maintains
that everything that may affect the state, from private
morals to public economy, is subject to regulation by
national authorities* There can be no reconciliation
between doctrines which purport to be so antithetical
to each other.
Fascism: War on Liberal Beliefs and Practices
The political, social, and economic order that
had evolved out of the nineteenth century was founded
on liberal convictions. Democracy and parliamentary
government with their assumption that political author-
ity should be vested in the people and be expressed in
the interests of the people was the building block on
which most of the western nations constructed their
political structure. Capitalism, with its emphasis on
free trade, free enterprise, and individual initiative
was an outgrowth of the liberal philosophy in the econ-
omic sphere.
Democracy was called "the mud of liberalism" by
the Nazis and was accused of promoting anarchy by the
Italian Fascisti, 1 * At a party rally in 1936, Hitler
remarked: "No nation has ever been created by democracy,
18
but all the great world empires have been wrecked by it.
And this I predict! if democracy is not defeated, the
civilization of mankind will not increase but will dim-
inish. " Thus, fascism rejected the practices as well
as the beliefs on which liberal governments were erected.
State sovereignty was substituted for popular sovereignty.
The fascist not only believed that the great mass of
citizens was not a suitable advocate of social interests
and that the true will of the people could not be dis-
closed through parliamentary votes and plebiscites, but
could only be expressed through the Fiihrer-like leader,
but also that the method of arriving at political judge-
ments was unimportant. The ends were all-important;
the means insignificant.
Almost to the same degree that fascism had trodden
upon liberal democracy, so had it abandoned liberal
economics. As with the negation of political rights,
basic liberal economic freedoms such as freedom of
occupation, free competition, free international exchange
of goods and services, and free public enterprise, were
13
usually severely restricted if not eliminated. In
general, state agencies shared control with the manager
of a business over his business; or, the agency, by itself,
became the dominant party in a business. The theoret-
ical foundation of the fascist economy was based upon
19
three principles* first, the welfare of the state is
always superior to that of the individual; second, pro-
duction is the "basis of national strength, thus, labor
forms is a social duty; and third, the state must
control and plan the production for the nation--however
,
private initiative is preferable to state socialism.
^
In short, under fascism, the era of free world trade
and individualism had passed.
To those writing in the early fascist period, the
coining to power of an ideology so thoroughly and diamet-
rically opposed to the tenets of liberalism and the
practical application of these views could only mean
the passing of a system characterized by outmoded liberal
ideas. One author remarked that*
Since the Great War there have not been many
convinced adherents of Western civilization
, . »
The further society drew away from the funda-
mentals of Christianity, from peace, from love
of one's neighbor, from charity, the more recep-
tive became its members to new doctrines and
new faiths.16
Such beliefs as exemplified by Hitler's battle-cry,
"victory to the strong and subjection or annihilation
to the weak,” or policies resulting from victories such
as Mussolini's "March on Rome," were interpreted by the
authors of the twenties and thirties as symbolizing a
declaration of war against the very basis of post-
war Europe .
^
In both word and deed, the fascist move-
20
ment was seen as a deliberate rejection of the liberal's
tenets and practices. These authors perceived that
liberal government and liberal economics were on trial
—
and in the thirties, they were losing miserably.
Fascism not only refuted the theoretical basis
on which all social and political institutions of the
twentieth century had been constructed, but it also
went further in its negation of European traditions.
The lack of positive creed and the abundance of abro-
gative assertions attests to the extreme degree to which
the fascist force ventured in order to discount former
European ideas and beliefs. In fact, it went further
than any other political movement in its renunciation
of the past—it made this disavowal the essence of its
1
8
ideology. The fascists even went so far as to deny
ideas and concepts which were, in themselves, antithetic.
Fascism was both anti-democratic and anti-authori-
tarian:
The democratic nations are ruled only for the
advantage of the Jews, and we must be prepared
to meet their aggression, (Reich Commissar
Burckel) 1 ^
It is silly to claim that National Socialism
rules by dictatorship. The government of the
Fuhrer of Germany is the most genuine and. pur-
est democracy in the world. (Dr. Frick, Minister
of the Interior ) 20
anti-imperialistic and anti-pacifist:
Foreign policy (will be) inspired by inter-
21
national solidarity and national independence,(First Program of the Italian Fascist Movement.
March 23, 1919)*1
War is to man what motherhood is to woman.
(Mussolini ) 22
anti-liberal and anti-conservative:
The fascist negation of socialism, democracy,
liberalism, should not, however, be interpreted
as implying a desire to drive the world back-
wards to positions occupied prior to 1789.
(Mussolini
)
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the list of contradictions could be continued extensively.
The leading fascists themselves made so many contradic-
tory statements that almost anything could be proved
against them.
Thus, it appeard to these early writers that the
absence of an unambiguous and convincing creed and the
overemphasis on the refutation of the entire European
past signified the collapse of the old social and political
order based on its former concepts and tenets. The rise
of fascism marked the disinheritance of the liberal
and socialist thought of the nineteenth century.
The collapse of the belief of the capitalist
and socialist creed was translated into terms
of individual experience by the World War and
the Great Depression, The catastrophes broke
through the everyday routine which makes one
accept existing forms, institutions,
. . .
They suddenly expose the vacuum behind the
facade of society. The European masses real-
ized for the first time that existence in
this society is governed not by the rational
and the sensible, but by blind, irrational,
and demonic forces. 24
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Fascism* A Movement — Not a Viable Theory
The great distress which had come over Europe as
a result of such shattering experiences of the early
twentieth century, the First World War, the Bolshevik
Revolution, and the Great Depression, was seen by these
observers as signifying the beginning of the end. 2 ^
These bouleversements represented both the means of
breaking down the old order as well as the immediate
products of a society enthralled in a period of chaos
and despair. The evolution to a fascist form of govern-
ment simply marked the final demise of a civilization
already in trouble. Therefore, fascism was interpreted
in principally two ways: the last attempt of liberalism
to save itself from its total defeat, or, a society in
the throes of a period of transition from liberalism to
some other philosophical doctrine which western society
was not yet ready to accept.
In short, fascism was believed to be either the
last stage in one period of the world's development
—
the liberal interim—or merely the dogma that happened
to prevail in a time of metathesis. In any case, both
of these views boil down to the same thing: fascism was
simply the reflection of a part of the larger crises
in the liberal West. Thus, most men of the twenties
and thirties regarded fascism not as the shape of things
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to come in the future, but rather as the evidence that
something in the old world had collapsed. 2 ^ Like the
other horrible and devastating phenomenon of their time,
fascism would also pass. As one historian wrote:
-Happily, however, the phenomenon of dictatorship is
temporary.
"
2 ^
The intellectual poverty of the fascist movement
was quickly perceived by these early writers. It is
true, of course, that fascist propagandists liked to
present their ideology as founded on ideas expressed
by such profound political thinkers as Machiavelli,
Tritsche, Hegel, and Nietzche; however, these post-war
I historians were disposed to recognise that this could
be done only by bastardizing or vulgarizing brilliant
and esoteric philosophies. Fascism, as its leaders are
often quoted as saying, developed as a movement in prac-
tice without a theory. "In the now distant March of
1919 »" said Mussolini in his article for the Enciclopedia
Italiana
.
"since the creation of the Fascist Revolution-
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ary Party, I had no specific doctrine in mind." And
Francisco Franco admits to this same lack of rational
theory: "The movement that we are guiding today is just
29
this: a movement more than a program."
In short, there really was no coherent doctrine
that the fascists followed but only a series of aphor-
isms, aspirations, and exclamations. The fascists them-
2k
selves often boasted that they divorced action from
thought and theory from practice. Hence, fascism was
believed to be neither a philosophical or a rational
approach to politics nor even a political theory that
could be grasped in a set program. In essence, its
philosophy was pragmatic; when the fascists had intro-
duced a goal or platform, they had been willing to
abandon it if it were discovered that it was contradic-
tory to or inadequate for the leader's purposes. At
best, thought occupied a secondary place in the person-
ality of a good fascist citizen; sentiment and movement
were the essential elements.
By virtue of its repugnance for intellectualism,
fascism is hostile to the sciences, philosophy, theology
—
all the intellectual pursuits in which knowledge is
*
sought for its own sake. In effect, fascism denies
value to all activities which are not undertaken for
practical purposes but are followed for the sake of the
intellect. It abhors all matters which make thought
. 30
a higher quest than or a prerequisite to action.
Fascist slogans— "Men make History," "Deed before
Thought," "Action, not Words "-exemplify well the anti-
intellectual base of fascist thought. In fact, fascist
ideology is considered almost primitive in its essential
irrationalism and aspirations.
25
• . • violence has today become the best
condition of real health for a people,
, . .
For the present esthetics of filthy lucre
we oppose—and let it come, let it come
—
an esthetic of violence and blooaj31
This intense disdain for the intellectual exercise
was carried over into the educational sphere. To devel-
op the intellect, open the mind, search for the truth
—
these are not the aims of fascist education. Rather,
to be blinded by faith, to understand without thinking,
to feel without conscience, to believe without facts
—
these are the purposes of fascist education. In sum,
fascist education equals fascist propaganda. There is
no place for a thinking, well-enlightened body of citizens
in a state dominated by the philosophy of a Francisco
Franco or a Sir Oswald Mosley.
Fascism, Economics and Despair
The liberal economic ideology that prevailed
throughout most of Europe in the inter-war period and
before was seen as particularly significant to the pro-
ponents of the "end of liberalism" view. It was noted
by these writers that the relatively small popularity
of fascism had always been preceded by a period of econ-
omic chaos and general distress in the different western
nations which then resulted in greater popular support.
In both Germany and Italy, the two great powers in which
fascist leadership had actually been successful in gaining
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command of the government and its various operations,
there had been overwhelming economic disturbances. In
the case of Italy, although she had emerged from The
First //orId War on the side of the victorious nations,
in a very real sense, she was very much one of the losers
i
she owed an enormous debt to her American ally, her
internal encumbrance alone was approximately five
billion dollars—a sum comparable to her entire nation-
al wealth. Realizing that Italy is essentially a
poor country— and without natural resources at that
—
the assertion of the will to live well was recognized
as unrealizable by the Italians. Economic instability
and despair was the mood of the Italian nation when the
II Duce came to power.
As with Italy, Germany, too, was in the throes
of financial crisis in the inter-war period. It is
sufficient to mention that in the winter of 1932 almost
six million workers were unemployed; relief and other
social insurance measures at that time were terribly
inadequate in dealing with such a large-scale rate of
unemployment .33 i n spite of economic improvements in
the following years, social conditions continued to be
in a state of turmoil. Very much aware of the connection
between economic chaos and the rise of fascism in Germany,
many writers linked fascism to an economic crisis in
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Europe’s capitalist system. It was their contention
that to have fascism, one must first have great economic
discontent—— desperate economics produce desperate
politics.
In addition to economic dissatisfaction, a feeling
of frustration on the part of the population itself or
of the social classes was believed to be another pre-
requisite for the successful development of fascism.
The inferior status imposed upon the people of Germany
by the Treaty of Versailles and the belief on the part
of many Italians that they had been treated unfairly
by their Allies in the final draft of the peace treaty
was pointed out by these authors as signifying an exten-
sion of the nation's economic disappointment into the
psychological realm. Hitler rose to power when the
savings and incomes of the middle-class was virtually
wiped out by post-war inflation; Mussolini was hailed
as the II Duce when the masses refused to be exploited
any longer by the industrialists and the landlords.
Thus, class warfare and/or national frustration were
added to economic turmoil by many writers as the necess-
34
ary ingredients to the making of a fascist society.
To those who lived and wrote during the victor-
ious rise of fascism to power—a time of economic
distress, class uncertainty, and national inferiority
—
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it seemed only natural to conclude that fascism was
simply the capitalist system on trial. It was their
thesis that for a nation to deliver itself unto fascist
insanity, it must possess a people fearful and disheart-
ened and without enough bread.
Furthermore, before the twentieth century, hist-
oriography was almost entirely political. The literature
had emphasized national wars, treaties, geography, great
men and their ambitions. Then came Karl Marx and history
writing became economics and class struggle, The
primacy of economic factors in determining the course
of history became the basis for the interpretation of
all historical phenomena.
Non-Marxian Interpretation
The standard non-Marxian economic analysis of the
fascist movement usually went something like this: During
the World War, greater governmental interference in the
economic operations of the nation was necessitated by
the exigencies of the conflict situation. As a matter
of military necessity, the state had to guarantee that
certain goods would be furnished the combatants. In
essence, a strong and all-encompassing government was
required to meet the urgent needs of a society engaged
in physical warfare. Since a strong syndicalist trad-
ition had existed in several of the West European states
29
before the outbreak of hostilities, national regulation,
and in some instances, actual governmental control, was
not regarded as particularly foreign or threatening
to the populations of many of the nations involved.
Directly following the war, most of the economic enter-
prises were eliminated; however, an important precedent
had been set in times of crisis, strong governmental
control is called for in the name of the nation-state,
and the idea had been accepted by many that "all citizens,
capitalists with their capital, laborers with their
hands, and intellectuals with their brains must work to
produce for the greatness of the nation.
And indeed, the post-war situation in many of the
war-torn nations, especially that of Italy and Germany,
could easily be described as a crisis period. The im-
poverishment of the countries by the war and class con-
flict as well as the demoralization of the populations
by the Versailles Treaty resulted in a condition very
close to anarchy and mass panic .
^
Thus, the demands
of post-war political and economic considerations were
seen as pregnant with possibilities in the eyes of many
of these writers* fascism was merely one of the numerous
possibilities
.
In essence, it was believed by the non-Marxian
economists that some of the nations were forced back to
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the economic paternalism which had existed during the
First World War by an exhausted people's belief that
the machinery of a strong, authoritarian government was
required to help reproduce the healthy economic and pol-
itical lij.e that had once reigned in their nation*
Furthermore, these same defeated people had long noted
that recovery programs under liberal economic theory
only breed division—something that their feeble econ-
omies could not afford to encounter—rather than establish
the social and economic peace that was so desperately
needed. Therefore, so stated most non-Marxian analyses,
fascist parties were able to seize control of several
of the governments on the premise that they would be
able to deal with the chaotic situation better than a
more liberal, democratic regime. As one social scien-
tist states*
It became evident that while liberal and dem-
ocratic methods might be sufficient for the
ordinary routine of government, they did not
suffice in times of stress. Fearing the spread
of Communist sentiments, the capitalists and
the middle classes united their efforts for the
preservation of the present order. 38
In short, fascism was viewed as an antidote to the
"evils of irresponsibility, of exploitation of private
interests, of individualism grown defiant . The policy
of laissez-faire was interpreted as being suitable only
in times of abundance and optimism; in periods of depress-
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ion and turbulence, it appeared as a logical turn cf
events to these observers that the citizenry would
look to a strong government for assistance; and the
fascist party insured the masses that a government
under their leadership would be a strong force. Thus,
these non-Karxians believed that the populace willingly
abandoned their liberal ideology and the economic free-
dom that went along with it in order to rid themselves
of the irrational and incalculable force that appeared
to be destroying Europe. These authors believed that
the masses saw freedom as incompatible with economic
well-being; those European people who decided in favor
of economic security also voted for fascist dictatorship.
Bluntly stated, economic freedom equalled liberalism
equalled depression; economic security equalled fascism
equalled prosperity; or so many people in the 1920's
thought
.
The corporate state was to be the new structure
on which fascist governments were to build in order to
successfully abolish the social and economic strife
that plagued Europe. The intent was to apply fascist
principles of organization and control to the economic
sector. Since the corporazioni in Italy, the Kartelle
in Germany, the groupements in Vichy-France , and the
sindicatos in Spain were already existing entities con-
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trolling finance, employment, and production, they were
to be the instruments which, under the aegis of the state,
were to carry out the "integral, organic, and Unitarian
regulation of production with a view to the expansion
of the wealth, political power, and well-being" of the
^•1
nation. In other words, these corporations were the
administrative agencies in a given industry which were
designed to unite and control not only the workers, but
also the employers in that industry. The state was the
final arbiter of conflicts between labor and capital.
Since the corporation itself was partially the
product of the state, it was also dependent on the state.
It was a unit that transcended the interests of the in-
dividuals or groups involved and was bound to the aims
of the state. The objective of the corporation was
the welfare of the mythical nation rather than the well-
being of its members. More specifically, the final goal
of the fascist economic organization was the sustenance
of a permanent war economy just as continual aggression
was the ultimate aim of the fascist state. This meant
artificial "heroic" programs, Four Year Plans, and the
like.
Each corporation was subject to the direct will
of the government; only corporations were recognized as
legal and acceptable organizations by the state. In
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essence, the state controlled the corporations and the
corporations controlled the workers? free bargaining,
strikes, and lock-outs were eliminated because such
distrubances were potentially dangerous to the welfare
of the state.
The most important consequence of this fascist
economic structure was that business was protected from
the rigors of competition and the employers from the
hassles of free bargaining. All through the inter-war
period:
to escape the rigors of intensive competition,
agreements were made for price-fixing, product-
ion control, sharing of markets, establishment
of sales syndicates. 'The concentration movement
also took the form of outright consolidation of
concerns in holding companies and in mergers
and amalgamations,^2
In short, corporations were established in fascism's
sweeping movement toward giant businesses and a self-
sufficient fortress economy.
Marxian Interpretation
The Marxists of this period interpreted fascism
to be the political expression of all the contradictions
existing within the European social order, "Fascism,”
as one Marxist perceived it, "is the most complete and
consistent working out, in certain conditions of extreme
decay, of the most typical tendencies and policies of
4,3
modern capitalism." J Fascism was considered neither
3^
t° a x orm of authoritarian government suppressing
ail classes in western society, nor was it believed to
be a revolution inspired by those without enough bread,
nor was it even assumed to be the revolt of a people
psychologically defeated and economically ruined.
Rather, fascism was regarded as a counter-revolutionary
mass movement supported by the bourgeoisie and develop-
ed principally to defeat the revolution and build up
a dying capitalist state dictatorship.^
In short, fascism was said to symbolize the very
power of finance capital itself. The Communist Inter-
national declared fascism to be the "open, terrorist
dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic
and most imperialist elements of finance capital.
Fascism, it was stressed, was the way in which the
capitalist European nations were able to continue the
liberal economic social base which was at the time in
a state of crisis.
The Marxists of the twenties and thirties explained
that before World War I democracy was well-suited to the
aims of a capitalist economy!
The political rights which democracy grants
to the masses act as a sort of safety-valve
and prevent violent clashes between the rulers
and the ruled
. , .
Democracy enlarges the
capitalist market by encouraging the masses
to want more goods and by giving them, to
some extent, the means of satisfying their
needs .^'6
In essence, as long as democracy was conducive to the
objectives of the bourgeois class, it would appease the
masses by giving them a small share of the goodies.
"... (W)hen the feast is in abundance, the people
may safely be allowed to pick the crumbs,"^
However, following World War I, capitalism as a
whole was in a state of decline. Unlike the periodic
economic predicaments of the past, the financial crisis
was acute then, involving the system in its entirety
and threatening the profits of the wealthy class at
its very source. The inter-war European economic crisis
was without precedent. (Statistical data back to the
I 860 ' s failed to reveal any period during which the
decline in economic growth was so severe or so wide-
h a
spread as in the inter-war years. )
According to the Marxists, because of this gener-
al crisis of capitalism, abundance was no longer the
norm nor was democratic rule beneficial any longer to
the bourgeoisie. In order to restore their profits
and retain their position of dictatorship over the
masses, traditional democracy was thrown aside and the
ruling elite conjured up fascism. Thus, fascism was
the organization of the ruling bourgeoisie against the
working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia.
Fascism was understood to be invoked and subsidized by
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the bourgeoisie in an attempt to maintain their position
of power over the proletariat.
The Marxist approach considered fascism to be
the final stage in the evolution of capitalism, a result
deterministically conditioned by the internal dialectics
of the economic system itself
.
49 The Marxist critique
recognized fascism to be the stage of capitalism at
which productive forces could no longer be organized.
Fascism was simply the climax of capitalism—the time
when the "forces of production are in ever more violent
conflict with the cramping fetters of the existing
property relations of production"——the period when cap-
italism in decay is fighting for its very existence .^0
Thus, fascism, was seen as the policy of a united class
within western society, the bourgeoisie, who will ven-
ture to any extremes to maintain their dictatorship over
the proletariat. Fascism was considered to be one of
the only two alternatives possible for European civil-
ization at its present stage of development, the other
alternative was communism.
^
Furthermore, fascism was often related to various
classic Marxist notions, such as the fall of capitalist
profits. For example, democracy was seen as being
advantageous to capitalism in its "ascending stages,"
however, in its more advanced stages, in its "descending
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stages," a different type of political system was requir-
ed, a more dictatorial system. Therefore, fascism was
described as merely the final defense of capitalism in
its advanced and declining stage—not the independent
system arising in opposition to the existing structure*
The^ accession to power of fascism is not an
ordinary succession of one bourgeoisie gov-
ernment by another, but a substitution of
one form of class domination by the bourgeoisie
—
bourgeois democracy--by another form—open
terrorist dictatorship, -52
Just as these twentieth century authors had been
influenced by Marx's historical analysis, others were
equally impressed by the insights into human behavior
discovered by Freud and other psychologists and often
superimposed their concepts on a Marxian framework in
an attempt to explain the fascist phenomenon,
Erich Fromm's Escape From Freedom is an excellent
example of such literature. For Frcmm, as for most
other Marxists, it was recognized that "millions
. . ,
were eager to surrender their freedom as their fathers
were to fight for it; that instead of wanting freedom,
they sought for ways to escape from it; that other
millions were indifferent and did not believe the
defense of freedom to be worth fighting and dying for."^
Fromm, a self-proclaimed Marxist and scholar of Freudian
theory, understood fascism to be a mass reaction to the
psychological stresses of European capitalism. It was
Fromm’s Thesis that even though western man had success
fully thrown off the shackles of primitive society, he
had not been able to gain freedom in the true sense of
the words realization of his individual self—that is,
the true expression of his intellectual and emotional
personalities t
Freedom, though it has brought him independence
and rationality, has made him isolated and,
thereby anxious and powerless. This isolation
is unbearable and the alternatives he is con-
fronted with are either to escape from the
burden of this freedom into new dependencies
and submission, or to advance to the full
realization of positive freedom which is
based upon the uniqueness and individuality
of man. 54
In choosing fascist dictatorship, it was clear that the
masses in some nations chose the former alternative.
In brief, Fromm viewed capitalism as having
ambivalent consequences for modern mans while it cer-
tainly contributed to the positive freedom of human
beings in that it delivered them from traditional
bonds, it simultaneously imbued them with a sense of
insignificance and powerlessness. Thus, although cap-
italism had aided the growth of a critical, responsible
people, the possibilities for individual economic
successes and thereby, other achievements for these
same people had also been narrowed. With the onset of
the monopolistic phase of capitalism in the early twenti
the people’s struggle for freedom took on such great
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odds that the feelings of confidence and personal initi-
ative were replaced by despair and impotence. Submission,
i.e, fascism, was one path that could be followed to
avoid these sentiments of hopelessness and powerlessness
The fascist breakthrough, in Fromm's opinion, was there-
fore the end product of European man's reaction to the
psychological contradictions existing within the modern
capitalist system.
Writing in the shadow of several traumatic exper-
iences characterized by a mood of isolation and despair,
and sensing that fascist ideology had its roots in the
historical context out of which it emerged, it was natural
for these writers to interpret fascism as a phenomenon
arising out of a larger crisis of liberal society in
Europe. In fascism's brutality and lack of ideological
substance as well as its emphasis on refutation of the
past, these writers found a movement which they believed
to have been created and supported by a desperate people.
The fascist madness was, to their minds, the consequence
of the breakdown of liberal western civilization— "the
reflection of a society at the end of its creative
energies and intellectual resources."-^
^0
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CHAPTER II
FASCISM VIEWED AS TOTALITARIANISM
\
Much as the early interpretations of fascism were
inspired by the chaotic conditions existing in Europe
in the post- World War I period, those that prevailed
in the late thirties and forties were also based on
major events happening on the European scene. The
ubiquitous and significance of changes in European
society brought about by the twenties were only to be
amplified, extended and intensified by the events of
the next decade. It was no longer the pageantry and
the nationalistic statements that appeared utmost in
the minds of those who lived in the immediate pre-war
period, but the devastation wrought by and the barbaric
feats resulting from acts of the German nation led by
Adolph Hitler. Living under the full impact of the
monstrous deeds carried out by the Nazi state, it no
longer seemed appropriate to the men of that time to
compare Hitler’s creation solely to that of Mussolini
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or to the other fascist dictatorships of the twentieth
century; the social scientists now believed that Stalin's
regime in the Soviet Union actually furnished a more
meaningful comparison.
*
The Influence of the Times
Hence, whereas most earlier writers had sought
to understand fascism in terms of contemporary West
European social, economic, and political experiences,
those authors who directly followed were convinced that
fascism should be studied in a context vis-a-vis commun-
ism. Both the communists and the fascists were credited
with being the leaders of a common attack on a free,
tolerant, open society; with having politics linked to-
gether by their anti-liberal philosophies; and with
advancing systems paralleling one another in their
coherent and homicidal qualities. One author wrote
that historians had desperately tried to fool themselves
into believing that fascism and communism were not
made of the same cloth because of fundamental, system-
atic differences; however, in reality, he stated, both
ideologies represented two factions of the same camp
and the free world had mistakingly allied itself with
one in order to defeat the other. The true enemy was
2totalitarianism which was not defeated at all.
For those who lived and wrote during communism's
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fascism's climax
,
both movements represented pari
of the same massive plague that endangered the civil-
ization that western man had so painfully constructed.
With the simultaneous unfolding of communism and fascism,
it appeared that the tension at both ends of the polit-
ical spectrum—right and left—had resulted in the
coming together of political extremes.-^ Bolshevism
was described as being "the fascism of the left," just
as fascism was considered to be "the bolshevism of the
Jr
right." The result of this fusion of political
extremes, they concluded, was a new and unique form of
governmenti totalitarianism. ^ In this construction of
things, communism and fascism merely became variations
of the novel and horrible type of rule which was now
only beginning to show its real potential.
Furthermore, unlike those thinkers who wrote when
communism and fascism were still undergoing change and
development—those who usually believed that systems
built on terror were only a passing phenomenon in the
West's development—the men who recognized fascism as
a form of totalitarianism believed it was the shape of
things to come in the future. New systems were being
built on terror in Asia and East Europe and the polit-
ical terror imposed by the communist party continued
to be the dominant instrument of control in the Soviet
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Union.
^
Against this background of monolithic regimes,
there was no reason for these authors to conclude that
the existing totalitarian systems would disappear.
Although most men agreed that a totalitarian government
may perish as a result of a major military defeat by
another power f internal evolution by the communist or
fascist government itself was not usually considered a
viable method by which a totalitarian system might
evolve into some type of democratic rule. Totali-
tarianism was, in their eyes, here to stay. As
Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski stated:
In terms of historical perspective, three
points might be added. First, certain auto-
cracies in the past have shown an extraordin-
ary capacity for survival. Not only the
Roman but also several Oriental empires
lasted for hundreds of years,'
. , . Second,
such autocracies have as a rule perished
in consequence of foreign invasion. Third,
their autocratic features have usually
been intensified over long period of time.
. .
In short, some of these autocracies were
not sta.ble, but lasting.?
The fact that totalitarian nations could be stopped
or destroyed by physical force was of little comfort
to many people's state of mind during the immediate
pre-World War II period. It was remarked that the re-
movable of a power center of the totalitarian movement,
such as that which existed in Nazi Germany, by brute
force only signified the military defeat of one power
by another—not the eradication of the roots or ideas
incipient in the movement or even the removal of the
movement from international politics
. The sympathy
expressed by the governments of Ireland and Portugal to
the no longer existing German nation after its defeat
by the Allies exemplifies well the belief that through
the outcome of a war, a movement may lose its base and
operational facilities, but not its impetus or its
followers c The statements released by and the prac-
tices adhered to by several of the ,,neutral H countries
after the announcement of the ruin of Nazi Germany
backed up many thinkers' opinions that fascism's defeat
by a military force only signified victory in a specifi
Q
war—not victory in the major battle.
For those writing during the mass killings of the
Stalinist purges and the Nazi prison camps, it is easy
to understand why communism and fascism appeared to
represent two sides of the same coin. The open terror
that had assumed such particularly inhumane forms in
both the Third Reich and Stalinist Russia had an omin-
ous character that appeared far more fundamental than
o
the two system's ideological differences."
Fascism's evolution away from the background of
the depression years and towards a more complete and
brutal form of totalitarianism, and its parallel devel-
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opment with Stalinism in the late thirties stimulated
the perspective that a proper understanding of the two
antagonistic systems might really begin with an acknowl-
edgement of their similarities. The common traits attri-
buted to Italy and Germany were also evident in Soviet
Russia: official ideology, mass party and omnipotent
leader, unceasing propaganda, centralised control of
the armed forces, state police, institutionalized terror,
etc. Therefore, some similar ideological concepts as
well as some very practical aspects of their leadership
were cited as evidence that the communist and fascist
systems were basically alike.
The Historical Development and Pre-World War
II Situations of Communist
and Fascist Nations
Although Stalinism showed its teeth to the world
several years before fascism was believed to be a viable
political system and one which would have to be reckoned
with, overwhelming similarities were noted—before the
fact—between the political and economic conditions of
both the nations gone fascist and those won over to
communism.
In the case of the communist as well as the fas-
cist states, poverty and anxiety, ferment and unrest,
were the dominant state of internal affairs before the
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dictatorial governments gained acclaim. 10 For example,
in addition to pre-1917 Russia being a vast and poor
agricultural territory where the peasants had never
learned the essentials of efficient soil cultivation
and where the ruling classes had squandered Russia's
natural resources on a grand scale, the Russian nation
was also an entity with little effective government
within her large borders. The pre-Stalinist government
was an infinite tangle of officers whose embroilments
made effective rule impossible, and the capricious
exercise of leadership by the czars, always struggling
to maintain their position, steadily made the ruling
establishment even more useless.
Although the specific problems plaguing the fas-
cist nations were, as well as being different from each
other, unlike those oppressing Russian society, the
magnitude of the difficulties was as pervasive and
staggering in the fascist instances as in that of Czar-
ist Russia. With currency inflation, rising prices,
increased unemployment and class struggles, the masses
were no better off economically in many of the West
European nations than were those of backward Russia.
The fact that those believed to be the most faithful
supporters of the totalitarian movements—the industrial
workers and the peasants in communist nations, the
lower middle class a.nd middle classes in fascism sta-c^,
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purportedly those classes most affected by the dispar-
ities of the times—added to the evidence that fascism
and communism were essentially similar radical move-
ments, incipient in different decades but resulting
from national predicaments alike in their depth, broad-
ness, and outcome.
The observers of the thirties and forties, although
realizing that the circumstances differed for each of
the nations v/hich had been won over to various types
of totalitarianism, also recognized that the ends
—
ruin, poverty, oppression—for certain large groups
within the population would have been the same under
the outmoded pre-totalitarian systems; radical changes
were needed if such threatened classes were to survive.
It was thus demonstrated that these perverse
new forms of government, communism and fascism, were
actually outgrowths of historical conditions that
had much the same implications for the industrial
workers in Czarist Russia as for those in Weimar Germany.
"As in the case of Russia, the fascist regime (in
Germany) had its driving force in a reaction against;
intolerable conditions ." 12 In essence, the communist
and fascist systems were thought to have evolved from
a series of grave crises—they were accredited with
being forms of crisis government.
5^
iHiO't only was it noted that both radical currents
arose in times of economic dislocations and distress,
but it was often remarked that the psychology of both
philosophies was deeply rooted in war and revolution*
bolshevism in the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the
defeat of 1917: the Italian Fascisti in the successful
but devastating First World War; Nazism in the lost
war in 1919. Communism in Soviet Russia and fascism
in Italy and Germany were regarded as illustrations
of the belief that violence begets violence. The
events of the early nineteen hundreds centered upon
unbridled upheavels and all-out terror; this atmosphere
imposed a pattern of brutal politics and a general
acquiescence with such violence which, during more
peaceful times, would not have been so readily accepted
by so many. Thus, both movements were thought to
have profited not only by the great general economic
and political discontent, but also by the radicalism
and violence that were very much a part of the contem-
porary scene and therefore, part of the mass psychology.
Those who espoused the view that the general con-
ditions for the different nations were similar at the
time when the various totalitarian parties came to
power often ventured further in their attempts to show
communism and fascism brother movements: the process
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of national development in the assorted countries before
the tyrannical take-overs was seen as correlating in
their essential stages in spite of profound differences.
For example, it was remarked by one writer that in the
two greatest dictatorships in the world, Stalinist
Russia and Nazi Germany, the sentiments of national
unity had not become crystallized until the nineteenth
century. "Consequently," this thinker deduced, “they
are very young nations ... The consciousness of this
'youth,' and consequently of inferiority in relation-
ships to other older nations, particularly the French
and the British, caused, by way of reaction, a super-
iority complex which espoused itself in all types of
Messianisms
• •
.
" In short, not only were the pop-
ulations of the various communist and fascist states
believed to have been undergoing the same types of
stresses when they looked to dictatorial rule for
salvation, but the people tolerant of autocratic regimes
were also seen as experiencing the same pattern of
general national development.
In keeping with this view, it was often remarked
that the frequent eruptions and far-reaching disturbances
in the social equilibrium as well as a lack of contin-
uity in the evolution of the states that took to modern
totalitarian ideologies played a preponderant role in
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"the formatr on of entities on which radical philosophies
could be grafted. Some writers even went so far as to
claim that factors such as geographic and anthropologic
characteristics were partly responsible for the swing
of the various governments to the far extremes of the
pendulum
:
Russia and Germany are plains open on
both sides, deprived of national frontiers.
This circumstance contributes to retarding
the process of political and psychical stab-
ilization,
. . .
The formation of states on
such plains is difficult. It necessitates
either a powerful dynamism which becomes a
unifying factor between the groups of states
or nations, or a powerful physical (military)
force, or one and the other intimately connect-
ed with each other. The open space, the lack
of natural frontiers, is a factor which devel-
ops individual and collective nomadism, express-
ing themselves in the historical evolution,
in the life of societies, institutions,
and social groups. I**
H. G. Alder, in his work on the Theresienstadt
ghetto, aptly described the relationship between the
individual, society, and the historical and physical
environments alluded to by many of these observers:
It is risky, but it fits the conditions more
closely, if we say that psychosis was rooted
in the environment, for reality itself was
schizophrenically split and disintegrated.
Thus there existed a 'perverted' psychosis
in the objective world; the subjective
abnormalities were only its reflex . . .
Every value, every feature, every trait
had sacrificed or altered its originally
valid meanings. Since this was true even
for the world outside the walls of the
citadel, it applied all the more in the
•ghetto' .15
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Much more than a simple comparison of like fea-
tures of the economic and political systems between
the pre-totalitarian communist and fascist nations was
usually entreated in the historical aspects of the total-
itarian view--other phenomenological criteria were
often regarded as relevant and important.
Ideologies: Similar Communist and
Fascist Components
In the ideological sphere, both communism and
fascism were opposed to social systems built on free
endeavor and liberalism; thus, it was concluded by
those who viewed fascism as a form of totalitarianism
that the development of these two Weltanschauungen,
fascism and communism, into concrete forms signified
1
6
the decline of democracy. A decline in democracy
meant, in the minds of most thinkers, the negation of
personal rights and political liberties of the individ-
ual. This lack of respect for the dignity of the indiv-
idual was considered to be the underlying bond between
communist and fascist ideology; the tie which put both
systems on the same side of the political spectrum.
The communist regime, in spite of its liberal
humanitarian sentiments, abolished individual freedom
17in the Soviet Union just as much as Nazi rule in Germany.
Both governments' claim to rule transcended the horizon
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of the ordinary and infiltrated all aspects of human
existence. Under both systems, the man existed for
the state rather than the state for the man; in ail
areas of life, the human individual was subordinated
to the needs of the state.
^
The fact that man's intrinsic value was not a
recognizable principle but was merely to be regarded
as an instrument to be used for obtaining glory for
the state led to the logical conclusion that the cit-
izenry, the society as a whole, rather than the indiv-
idual was to be the focal point about which the govern-
ment would plan its policies. Stalin, who repeatedly
indicated his belief that the final realization of
true communism could only be brought about by the
greatest departures from it, deified the state to the
same extent as Hitler and other fascists. For the
soviets as well as the fascists, the interests of the
individual were always neglected in favor of the inter-
ests of the party or the state in the name of the whole.
As Stalin stated in 1926: ”, , , (W)e are not liberals.
We put the interests of the Party above the interests
IQ
of formal democracy . . 7 This same sentence could
have been made by any one of the leaders of the fascist
movement. For both bolshevism and fascism, the group
remained the primary element in the hierarchy of values.
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In the words of one man writing in the 1930's j
• • • Communism and Fascism have just demon-
strated a first truth; thanks to modern tech-
nique, man can be treated exactly like adomesticated animal. This the free man isbeginning to surmise correctly; it is tech-
nically possible to govern immense collect-
ivi sms by taking rigorously into account
only what men have strictly in common, by
neglecting everything that differentiates
them, and by neglecting at the same time,
everything that has any relation with this
individualization. 20
Anti-individualization was not only the, fundamen-
tal doctrine emphasized in both anti-democratic philoso-
phies; a materialistic character mixed with spiritual-
istic and mystic elements was recognized as a primary
tenet of both systems. In the case of communist Russia,
it was historical materialism (dialectic method)—the
Marxist theory of history and society that holds that
ideas and social institutions develop only as a super-
structure of a material economic base 21 ; in the programs
of fascist Italy or Nazi Germany, it was biologic or
racial materialism—the conviction that society is a
product of eugenic and political processes. What the
racial doctrine did to make the individual sacrifice
for the good of the state in fascist nations, Marxism-
Leninism in a bastardized form did for those in Stalin's
Russia. Both these perceptions, racial and historical
materialism, purported to be scientific principles
which not only limited the individual in his own person-
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al development, out also forced him into the scheme of
a planned, materialistic world.
A concept which combined the anti-individual and
the materialistic aspects of these totalitarian ideolo-
gies was easily perceived by many authors to be the
claim of both philosophies to know what or who is the
sole possessor of complete truth. The particular form
of the communists' claim to "know" the truth rested on
the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. According to Marxism-
Leninism, if a man considers himself to be the monopo-
lizer of all that is veracious, he has the right to
enforce such knowledge on mankind for it is his duty to
recreate the world according to genuine and unadulterated
22laws. For the fascists, the claim that the true will
of the people manifests itself solely in the will of
the Fuhrer-like figure performed the same role that
the sophisticated theories of Marxism-Leninism did for
those who ruled Soviet Russia: both prescribed the laws
of a higher order of things that the regimes were obligat-
23
ed to impose on mankind. J
In the communist realm, the highest authority was
doctrine; in the fascist, it was the leader's will.
The outcome of the communist concepts led to the same
practical ends as did those adhered to by the fascists—
the governments imposed on its citizens the "truth,"
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i.e. that which is allegedly the people’s real will.
Hannah Arendt stated:
Totalitarian policy claims to transform thehuman species into an active unfailing car~
rier of law to which human beings otherwise
would only passively and reluctantly be
subjected. .If it is true that the link be-
tween totalitarian countries and the civil-
ized world was broken through the monstrous
crimes of totalitarian regimes, it is also
true that this criminality was not due to
simple aggressiveness, ruthlessness, warfare
and treachery, but to a conscious break of
^he consensus juris which, according to
Cicero, constitutes a ’people’;
. . , Both
moral judgement and legal punishment ore-
suppose this basic consent; the criminal can
be judged justly only because he has taken
part in this consensus juris , and even the
revealed lav/ of God can function among men
only when they listen and consent to it. 2^
The demand of both totalitarian movements to
completely dominate the men and the societies over which
they rule and to undertake the production of a new social
order and v/ith it, a new man, rested on the regimes’
claim to "know" the truth or the intention of history
and therefore, to be in a position of aiding its unfold-
ing. In accord with this claim, it was a fundamental
belief of both systems that a single group within society
was destined to carry out this special mission. As it
was with the humanistic mission of the proletariat in
communist ideology, so it was with the exceptional
mission of the Herrenvolk—its means of realization was
through the efforts of a single party having sole right
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to direct ail means of action to this end
.
25
All act-
ions were justifiable in the name of this great mission;
the party must do all that enhances its power for the
eventuality of the stated mission.
The myths and practices in question had, to a
large extent, grown out of the belief that the exist-
ence of a certain strata of people was threatened, not
by a. miJitary or political force, but by historic dangers?
the suppression of the masses by the capitalistic econ-
omi c system, or the racial-biological decay of the
Nordic masses by the infiltration of Judaism. A stereo-
typed image of the enemy helped reinforce this concept.
For the Soviets it was the degenerate bourgeoisie or
the v/ar-mongering American businessman; for the Nazis
it was at first the radical Bolshevik and later the fat
rich Jew or foreigner/'
Regardless of the differences in perceptions as
to just who was the enemy, the negative symbol not only
reinforced the authority of those who wielded power in
a particular community, but, as all myths, helped those
subjected to that power accept it as legitimate, "It
was believed in both these movements that they stood at
the pivot of world history, and they considered them-
selves chosen to bring about, by means of political
27
measures, the turning point that they felt to be due,"
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The demand for unlimited conxrol over the world and the
social lives of its citizens was translated into pol-
itical action by the governments of the fascists and
the Stalinists. The hunger for complete power was con-
sidered the essence of both communism and fascist ideology.
Communist and Fascist Practice
and Organizations
Unlike the dictatorships of the past, fascism and
Stalin's form of communism were totalitarian in their
objectives: The control of all phases of human activity,
as well as in their means: propaganda when adequate,
force when necessary. It was this totality, this com-
pleteness, this "allness" demanded by the communist and
fascist regimes that was responsible for the view that
these modern governments were "historically unique" and
Q
Msui generis". Most writers concluded that as a result
of technology and the pseudo-scientific theories passed
on from the nineteenth century, these systems hoped to
control those factors which made possible unprecedented
on
forms of human oppression . *~ y Friedrich and Brzesinski
wrote
:
What is really the specific difference, the inno-
vation of the totalitarian regimes, is the organ-
izations and methods developed and employed with
the aid of modern technological devices in an
effort to resuscitate such total control in the
service of an ideologically motivated movement,
dedicated to the total destruction and reconstruc-
tion of a mass society .- 0
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Both the communist and fascist dictatorships were group-
ed together as systems of rule resolved to the infiltra-
tion of all aspects of human existence—systems which
soughc to negate the infinite plurality and differentiation
of human beings.
The urge for totality evident in these movements*
ideologies was fully reflected in their political prac-
tices and in their organizations. Whereas previous types
of oppressive governments were restrained in the methods
they employed to achieve compliance with their ideals
or with the laws of the land, modern totalitarian dic-
tatorships unhesitatingly used the most flagrantly
immoral measures to attain unquestioning obedience.
In an atmosphere of madness and uncertainty, entire
nationalities and groups of people were destroyed in
the name of humanity. Such instances of mass murder
were described as "the final solution to the Jewish
question" by the Nazis and termed "the building of
communism" by the Stalinists.
Other methods, just short of genocide, were also
ruthlessly used to rid the state of infectious elements.
Purges were noted as being especially useful devices
in cleansing the ranks of those directly involved with
the totalitarian movement itself .^ 1 However, for those
not directly associated with the movement—the kulaks
65
in communist states, the Jews and Bolsheviks in fascist
nations—a fate more feared than death was declared
just and necessary: life behind the barbed wire of a
concentration or work camp. The Soviet Union's labor
camps were often compared to purgatory where "neglect
is combined with chaotic forced labor. The camps
of Nazi Germany were stated to represent hell in the
most literal sense—a place in which "the whole of
life was thoroughly and systematically organized with
a view to the greatest possible torment."^ Friedrich
and Brzezinski remarked that in one sense, it was the
presence or absence of such inhumane institutions that
ji
tested the totalitarianism of a regime."'
From the brutal practices of the communist and
fascist states, it was deduced that the utilization
and development of totalitarian methods of domination
and punishment were based on the nihilistic principle
that everything is possible. Together the fascists
and the communists not only accomplished the most astound-
ing political and moral crimes in the entire history
of mankind: the fascist murder of twelve million civil-
ians in Hitler's Germany, half of them Jews; the Soviet
destruction of five million peasants in the Soviet
Union because of their resistance to Stalin's collect-
ivization policy—but also hoped to accomplish the
most important aims* the Soviet Five Year Plan, the
fascist conquest of Europe.
The totalistic approach of these movements was
full^ reflected in their political structures: one
leader, one party, one ideology. No aspect or function
of human existence was admitted to be beyond the scope
of the leader* s power, outside the interests of the
party, or irrelevant to the ideology. All phases of
human thought, feeling, and action were subjugated to
the organization and belief-system of the movements.
The deification of and the power allocated to the three
components—leader, party, ideology
—
gave these three
parts special significance in the totalitarian scheme.
The totalitarian leadership principle expressed
the most extreme form of absoluteness inherent in the
systems* broad ideological make-up. Unlike the many
dictators who had ruled their nations with an iron
fist before the regimes of Mussolini, Stalin, or Hitler
these twentieth century demigods were not content mere!
with being king of the land: the totalitarian leader
wanted to be both absolute ruler and high priest.
He not only wanted to decide which doctrines were to
be employed for the cause, but he also insisted on
interpreting the credenda on which the movement rested.
In the case of fascism, the concept of dictator-
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leader was central to the over-all philosophy. Since
fascist ideology was created to a large extent by the
leaders of the fascist movement themselves, it is under-
standable that the role alloted to the figure of the
leader would be crucial to the general thought.-^ In
fascist doctrine, the leader is believed to embody
in his own person the will and destiny of his people.
From this conviction came the view that resistance to
the leader's will or to one of his government’s decrees
was wrong. Since the leader maintained that he was
acting in the best interests and for the highest ideals
of his nation's people, the citizenry owed him unquest-
ioned obedience.
Communist doctrine, as promulgated by Marx, dis-
paraged the role of the leader; impersonal environmental,
social, and economic forces, groups and classes, rather
than the power of a specific individual received the
emphasis in Marx's theoretical analysis. However, this
aspect of communist catechism was fundamentally modified
by the concept of the "professional revolutionary" intro-
duced by Lenin. According to Lenin, Marx was incorrect
in his belief that the proletariat would be freed from
the yoke of economic slavery to the capitalistic system
by the spontaneous action of the workers; a coup,
planned and effectuated by an elite, "the professional
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revolutionaries , " was required for the liberation of
the masses. Within this select association of revolu-
tionary leaders, one figure, was then to emerge as the
undisputed head of the new government ,
^
Communism's and fascism's emphasis on war and
conflict, mission and destiny, reinforced the ideolo-
gical desideratum of both philosophies for a dictator-
ial leader with a practical need. In periods of
belligerencies and bellicosities, a nation is usually
more willing to accept, and even often welcomes, strong
leadership and discipline than it is in periods of
concord and quietude. But, conforming to the tenets
of the two theories, both communism and fascism are
obligated to do battle until their particular goals,
i.e, the entire world is communized, Europe is domin-
t
ated oy the fascists, are reached. In essence, a
strong dictator-leader was required by the practical
policies adhered to by the totalitarian systems as
well as by their written gospels.
Complementing the absoluteness attributed to the
province of the leader was the place o.ccupied by the
officially endorsed state party. In the matured commun-
ist or fascist society, only one party was permitted
by the state—all other parties were outlawed by decree.
This single party was recognized as playing a drastically
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different role irom that taken by any of the parties
found in constitutional democratic regimes: rather
than represent the interests of a specific group
within society, the totalitarian party was actually
"an agency of government, no more independent than
the army or the police." 39 Many wrote that the real
purpose of the party was to provide a following for
the leader (with which he could identify).
Where democratic political parties conscious-
ly emphasize diversity and mutual criticism,
the political party in the Communist or Fas-
cist dictatorship is the body of the faithful
who are dedicated to maintaining the one
truth which their leaders avow . 40
The party in totalitarian states was therefore
an instrument to be used by the state's self-proclaimed
God, not a master to give him orders. Mussolini des-
cribed the function of the party in dictatorial states
well when he compared the role of the party to that
of the capillaries in the human body: "it is neither
the heart nor the head, but those endings where the
blood of party doctrine, party policy and party senti-
• .
hi
ment mix with the rest of the body politic." In
short, in no case did the party in either the communist
or fascist instances act as a restraint on the leader's
power.
While the importance of the party to the leader
himself was perceived by all students of the totalitarian
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model in the immediate pre-World War II period, the men
of the period also understood the party to he the
vital link between the bureaucratic machinery of the
state and the mass of subjects—the chief vehicle for
inspiring and organizing mass participation and engin-
consent. In contrast to democratic parties,
the single mass party was the chief means of control
throughout the state. By use of extensive propaganda,
the party aimed to convince the people that the govern-
ment was always right and that it acted in their best
interests
.
Authors writing in the thirties and forties saw
fascism in the domestic realm as meaning dictatorship
under one party headed by a "leader." Because of the
fascists' hatred of freedom, the government it construct-
ed suppressed free speech, free press, and free worship.
Fascism demanded blind obedience to the leader and the
party without referendum, recall, or impeachment.
In the international field, fascism was imperial-
istic and based its aggression on the concepts of
patriotism, humanism, and racial superiority. It used
propaganda untiringly in order to subordinate the truth
and facts to political objectives, Morality was consider-
ed to have no place in the politics of fascist nations.
All means were justified in pursuit of a political end.
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Many men in the decades proceeding and following
the Second World War saw these factors as the individ-
ual components which, when added up, equalled one
simple sumi "totalitarianism, which is to say, the
eclipse of individualism, which is to say, among other
things, Communism," When one took any item in this
account dictatorship, militarism, imperialism
—it des-
cribed all too well the situation which existed in
Stalin’s Russia. Racism was seen as the only element
missing because it did not suit the needs of the leaders
of Soviet Russia as it did those of the fascist nations.
Although there was a great amount of difference
between the Marxist aim to lead all of mankind into a
state of definitive freedom and the fascist hatred of
freedom, the totalitarian claim to power in the practical
aspects of its leadership as well as similarities in
ideological features and historical circumstances des-
troyed the essential differences between the communist
and fascist regimes and tenets. The role delegated to
such organizations as the political police and the
tactics employed by the leaders of both the communist
and fascist governments did much to level the differ-
ences betv/een the communist Soviet system and the fas-
cist system j as is often stated, "Actions speak louder
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than Words." Put more directly* Nazism equalled fas-
cism equalled mass murder; Stalinism equalled communism
equalled mass murder. Thus, fascism equalled communism
in the minds of these conservative scholars. Living in
an era of such monstrous crimes by both the communists
and the fascists, is is any wonder that these men per-
ceived both systems as merely being variations of
the same horrible thing—totalitarianism?^3
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CHAPTER II - NOTES
Allardyce
,
The Place of Fascism in European
£LL§ftpr.y > P« 13. Although these authors drew uoon
fascist and communist experiences elsewhere, it is
necessary to note that fascism "became identified with
Nazism and communism with Stalinism in the minds of
those who lived when these movements were at their
peaks.
.
It was the comparative study of the Nazi and
Stalinist systems which really gave birth to xhe total-itarian model itself.
2
Herbert L. Matthews, "Fascism is not Dead,"
Nations Business . XXXIV (December, 1946), 40.
3It has often been argued that right-wing ideolo-
gies differ from left-wing philosophies on two essential
points* those on the left consider the individual to
be the focal point while those classified as right
take the collective entity as their dominant theme;
leftist doctrines are based on the belief that man is
good, an intelligent and moral being, while right est
dogmas find their origins in the belief that man is
corrupt and selfish. These arguments broke down in
dealing with the communist and fascist dictatorships
of the 1930’s and 40*s. As Leonard Schapiro states:
"In what sense can man be said to be the central point
in Stalin’s or even Lenin's Russia, with its total
overwhelming emphasis on class, on party and on the
community, and its total disregard of the individual
in the process." Furthermore, although "it certain-
ly can be argued that Lenin believed in the goodness
and essential perfectibility of man, But Stalin?" In
posing such questions it is easy to understand why
ideologies which purported to be enemies in theory
might really be cohorts in essence, Leonard Schapiro,
Totalitarianism (London: Fall Mall, 1972), p. 84.
According to Robert Vincent Daniels
,
graphically illustra-
ted, the two political scales of program (left-right)
and method (hard-soft) make a rectangular figure.
The Stalinist and Hitlerian movements are represented
as occupying the same location in the figure. Robert
Vincent Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution
(Mass.* Harvard University, 1965)* P«" 435, appendix III.
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4Allardyce, The Place of Fascism in European
History
, p. 14.
^The term totalitarianism is used here specifically
in reference with the interpretation of this particular
model or school of thought. A useful definition of
totalitarianism might be the following i "all aspects of
human life are subject to intervention by the state,
which reserves the right to provide final judgment, both
value and practical judgments, in all various areas of
human expression.” N. Kogan, "Fascism as a Political
System,” in The Nature of Fascism
, p. 11.
^Allardyce, The Place of Fascism in European
History
, p, l4.
7
'Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brsezinski,
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy
.
2d ed. (Mass
j
Harvard University, 1965) » PP. 5-g.
o
The Irish government proclaimed its sorrow at
the demise of Hitler's government while Portugal set
aside two days of mourning—an unusual practice even
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under ordinary circumstances. Hannah Arendt,Seeds of a Fascist International," pp. 14-15.
"The
9This approached emphasized the structure and
methods oi modern dictatorships with a focus upon
what totalitarian dictatorships do rather than whatthey profess.
By this sentence I do not mean to imply that
once the totalitarian regimes were in power, the Drob-lems that existed and, to some degree, made the ascensionto pov/er 01 the lascist parties possible, disappear-
ed or were successfully dealt with. This was the cas®in some of the fascist and communist nations with
some of the problems, but certainly not in any one
of the modern dictatorial states with all of the
problems
.
11Arthur E. Adams, Stalin and His Times (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, & Winston,” Inc
. , 1972), p. 3,
-^E. G. Dyason, "Bolshevism, Fascism, and Dem-
ocracy," The Economic Record . VIII (December, 1932), 165.
13George Clement, "Bolshevism and Nazism," New
Europe
. I (March, 1941), 97.
“
lZ*Ibid
.
1 5
H. G. Alder, Theresienstadt 1941-45 Das Antlitz
einer Zwangsgemeinshaft , 2d ed." (Tubingen, i960) , Cited
in Hans Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule (Conn.: Wesleyan
University, 1968), p. 40.
^Alexander Krisztics, "Essential Principles of
Socialism, Fascism, and Democracy," Annals of" the
American Academy of Political and Social Science
7ju_~[9^-129;
17Hans Buchheim wrote that Nazism and Communism
were actually more alike in their totalitarian design
and its impact than was National Socialism with the
governments of Mussolini and Franco, in spite of common
fascist traits. Freedom was destroyed in Nazi Germany
and Stalinist Russia while it was merely limited in
Mussolini's Italy and Franco's Spain. Buchheim,
Totalitarian Rule
, pp. 29-30.
1 P
It is necessary to remember that under Stalin,
Marxism-Leninism was thoroughly debased.
?6
19
... „
Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Illinois
i
The Free Press, 1935), p. 113.
20de Greef, “Psychology of the Totalitarian
Movement,” p. 131.
21
"According to the teachings of dialectical
materialism, all of reality can he represented ration-
ally in a closed system? this means that there is no
transcendence at whose frontiers the human spirit willbe caught between two worlds,” Buchheim, Totalitarian
Rule
, p. 18,
22
Ibid.
, pp. 17-18,
23For a thorough discussion of the roles played
by myths in communist and fascist ideologies, see
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New
York* Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), especially
chapter 13 s "Ideology and Terror* A Novel Form of Gov-
ernment,” pp. 460-79.
24
* Ibid
.. p. 462.
26^Clement, "Bolshevism and Nazism,” p. 98.
26
°Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dic -
tatorship and Autocracy
, pp. 90-91,
27
'Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule
.
P. 48. This char-
acteristic of totalitarian rule was described as the
"institutionalization of anxiety” by Franz Neumann.
Neumann explained that in all societies there are antagon-
istic groups composed in a hierarchical manner. When
the position of one of these groups is threatened in
some way, and the group as a whole does not understand
why it is threatened ("the historical process") a con-
dition which Neumann termed "persecutory anxiety"
results. Because of the inability of the group to
understand "the process of crisis," there is a frequent
need "to ascribe blame for them to sinister powers . . .
German National Socialism and Italian Fascism are class-
ical examples" of such a psychological process. Franz
Neumann, The Democratic and Authoritarian State (New
York* The Free Press, 1957) » pp. 271-73» 288-293.
2 fl
Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dic-
tatorship and Autocracy , p. 5.
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.
The "things ^hat liberal writers had oncedescribed. as measures of man's progress—technology,
science, industry—appeared to these writers to bethe very factors which made such an advanced form oftotalitarianism, communism and fascism, possible. Thoseduring uhe thirties and forties believed thatthese factors were the necessary prerequisites forthe fulfillment of the desire for totality, an elementthey considered inherent in modern political theories.
30
Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictator-
ship and Autocracy
, p, 17,
31Comparison were often made between such incidences
as the German Purge of 1933 and the series of purges
that occured in the Soviet satellites in 1946 .'
32Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
, p. 445.
34Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictator-
ship and Autocracy
, p. 296 .
36Arendt
,
The Origins of Totalitarianism
, p. 440.
3 £>J Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictator-
ship and Autocracy
, p. 33.
37Mussolini's official title was "II Duce" and
Hitler's was "Der Fuhrer"—the Italian and German words
for "The Leader." William Ebenstein, Totalitarianism s
New Perspectives (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
1962), p. 54 .
38Ibid.
30
" Ibid
.
, p. 52. Serious questions arose as to
whether the fascist and communist single party could
properly be termed a party—this depended, of course,
on the definition of party that one chose to accept.
Sigmund Neumann denied that the single party in either
dictatorial system could rightly be described as a
party because "every party in its very essence signi-
fies partnership in a particular organization and
separation from others by a specific program. Such an
initial description, to be sure, indicates that the
very definition of a party presupposes a democratic
climate and hence makes it a misnomer in every dictator-
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?*£?.•" . Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties(Illinois i University of Chicago, 1956), p. 395',Friedrich ^and Brzezinski, on the other hand, beiievethat the fascist and communist parties are parties inthe true sense of the term. According to them, a pol-itical, party is "a group of human beings, stably organ-ized. v/ith the objective of securing or maintaining
for its leaders the control of the government
. ,
"
Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship nnrl
Autocracy;, p. 45. However, those on both sides of the
question did agree that totalitarian parties did differ
significantly from western parties.
40Gwendolen M. Carter and John H. Herz, Govern-
ment and Politics in the Twentieth Century (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), pp. 100-01
.
41
Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictator-
ship and Autocracy
, pp, 47-48.
42Matthews, "Fascism is not Dead," p. 40,
43As was noted earlier, Stalinism was a vulgar-
ization of Marxism-Leninism. However, was Nazism an
abberation from the fascist norm? Hannah Arendt thought
not. She believed that fascism achieved its ideal form
in Nazism. However, a French author wrote: "When we
ask what there is in National Socialism that can be
retained in a coherent definition of fascism, the
thing that strikes us is its alien character, that is
to say its character of being fundamentally Germanic
and unsuited to other peoples." This debate still
continues today. Bardeche, Qu'est-ce que le fascisme?
.
pp. 25-26.
CHAPTER III
FASCISM VIEWED AS A REVOLT
AGAINST MODERNIZATION
As the world which had inspired fascism's
totalitarian wedlock with communism passed into
history so did the belief that fascism and communism
were similar generic phenomena. Authors writing
in the fifties and sixties realized that the unpre-
cedented horrors of the thirties and forties were
now part of the past, and therefore it was believed
necessary to place the phenomena of fascism in per-
spective, Unlike the men who wrote when Stalinism
and fascism were raging throughout the European contin
ent and threatening the entire civilization of mankind
those thinkers who were primarily concerned with v/hat
was novel and similar about communism and fascism—the
intent of those writers who soon followed, after the
fact, was not to discover what was so unique about the
movement itself but rather what was so different about
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the period during which fascism stormed. In essence
the two fold question was asked i Why did fascism come
to power when it did and what made it an acceptable
ideology to so many people? In the works of these
writers, fascism was separated from its connections
with communism and linked to the view that it was a
"political radicalism associated with a particular
level of European development, a radicalism which,
once confronted and overcome, was unlikely to recur
again in the Y/est."^
Consequences of Modernization
The decade of the 1950's ushered in a new era,
a period of political moderation and economic rebuild-
ing, social reordering and psychological analysis.
Nazi concentration camps and Stalinist purges no longer
described the contemporary situation of European
affairs. Events were not only changing for the better
for those locked behind the solitude and darkness
imposed by the Iron Curtain but also significant steps
were being taken by both the Soviets and the Western
powers to put an end to the Cold War which had dominated
East/West relations throughout the forties. A new
sense of optimism was emerging on the part of the
intelligentsia—an awareness that as a result of the
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Allied victory over the Axis powers and Stalin's death
in 1953, the world no longer lived in the nightmare
of inhuman crimes and perverse ideologies. The West
h<xd successfully passed through a most severe political
crisis, a crisis which had begun with the rise of fas-
cism and which had ended, to a significant extent,
with Stalin's death. Thus, fascism was seen as part
of the West's development, something which had existed
in Europe in the inter-war period, not a valid pol-
itical doctrine for post World War II Europe. 2 The
that the iVest had finally entered into a period
of relative political stability marked the mood of
these scholars.-^
In this perspective, fascism was seen as exempli-
fying a critical period in one stage of the West's devel-
opment—that phase when a nation is involved in changing
from an agrarian society to a modern, industrialized
entity. In the opinion of these thinkers, the road
to the modern world led through a time when societies
were subject to political radicalism—a period when
extreme political conflict prevailed. Fascism was looked
upon by many as one result of such intense political
and social conflict in the western hemisphere in the
twentieth century.
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Modernisation thus involves both a orocess
and a. consummation * societies undergoing in-
dustrial development are subject to seizures
of political extremism; advanced industrial
societies are characterized by political
consensus .4
And another social scientist stated 3 "The process of
shaping new principles or changing old ones is not with-
out its tensions , Thus, extreme ideologies such as
fascism were believed to originate during a society's
transition from one stage of development to another*
a period during which substantial agreement had not
yet been reached concerning fundamental political prob-
lems
.
It was argued that as any nation moved to the
more advanced stages of modernization, various non-
modern concepts and beliefs were threatened by the
spread of modern ideas. Since all nations which had
turned fascist were involved in some phase of the modern-
ization process, it was therefore usually assumed that
for a nation to have fascism, modernization or industrial-
ization must have reached a certain momentum within
the country. That is to say, all the fascist nations
had completed the elementary stage of modernization,
i.e. industrialization had been introduced into the
nation several years before fascism became popular,
but none of the nations had completed the modernization
process in its entirety—all the fascist nations were
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somewhere in between the two stages
.
7 Such was considered
to be the state of affairs in Europe in the inter-war
period* most of Western Europe was wallowing in the
middle of the modernization continuum
.
8
Furthermore, the degree of modernization reached
by the nations before the fascist take-over was seen
3.S a significant aspect by some authors. It was noted
that the degree of industrialization and modernization
paralleled the degree of radicalization* the more highly
industrialized a society, the more violent and intense
were fascist sentiments. ’’Thus Germany stood at top,
Italy lagged behind, and Spain and the others were at
the bottom."^
It was also recognized that the nations in the
middle of the modernization process were also "in the
middle of a conflict between two antithetical ways of
life, each with partisans strong enough to defend its
interests, but neither strong enough (as yet) to impose
its will upon the other ." 10 Plagued by serious ideol-
ogical conflicts as a result of this thrust to become
modern, i.e. industrialization and mass democratization,
fascism was considered a synthesis between the ambiva-
lent desires to go modern and at the same time, keep
the same political, economic, and social structures
that prevailed in the pre-modern era. At least in
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part, the fascist system was considered an attempt to
repress the conflict "between traditional values and
ways and modern norms and styles. In sum, fascism was
thought to be an outburst of protest against full
transition to a modern society and the implications
thereof.
The struggle between the modern and the non-modern
and its ’'reconciliation" through fascist ideology was
aptly described by one social scientist writing in the
sixties as the heritage of "conservative modernization"—
that attempt by pre-fascist governments to create a
modern state without giving up pre-modern values.
As they (the pre-fascist regimes) proceeded with
conservative modernization, these semiparliament-
ary. governments tried to preserve as much of
their original social structures as they could,
fitting large sections into new buildings when-
ever possible. The results had some resemblance
to present-day Victorian houses with modern
electrical kitchens but insufficient bathrooms,
. • . Ultimately the makeshifts collapsed. 12
For example, in Weimar Germany as well as in Italy under
Golitti, democratic norms and procedures had been intro-
duced to the people; however, true democracy was unable
to take hold because the landed elite refused to give
up their substantial amount of political power.
As a result of the failure of the pre-fascist
governments to really go modern and of their refusal
to bring about or of their inability to cause major
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transformations, the pre-fascist "democracies" were
unstable and eventually collapsed. However, in the
words of one author, before the pre-fascist regimes
were replaced, "tney had tried to make reaction pop-
ular in the form of fascism." 13 I -,hort, the result
of this residue of reactionary lou ,ngs coupled with
the concern to become more modern was thought to lead
in time to the fascist mentality.
Fascism appears to have been a product of
industrial underdeveloped, but not under-
developed countries where parliamentary-
democratic pegs failed to fit in vacant
feudal or absolutist holes, 14
Total or Partial Demodernization?
For those who espoused the view that fascism was
part of the modernization process there was little
agreement as to whether fascism and Nazism were princi-
pally attempts to return to what was rather than to
progress to what was to be*
. , . (T)he example of , , , Fascism and Nazism
in Europe in the twenties and thirties, should
be mentioned as perhaps the most important
cases, at much more advanced levels of develop-
ment, of breakdowns of modernization—and with
much more far-reaching attempts to almost
total demodernization. 15
Or, in fact, whether it was actually more of an attempt
to slow down the pace of modernization— to stifle but
not to completely stop the progress—and therefore,
have the government be in a position to control its
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consequences
i
The effect of syncratic government is not,
however, to stop the process of economic mod-
ernization. As we have seen, syncratic systems
represent an attempt
. , , to slow down the
pace of industrialization and to control its
consequences .16
In the first instance, fascism was characterized
as a complete disavowal of modernity and industrializa-
tion in favor of tradition and old ways; those who
adhered to the second view argued that fascism was an
attempt to go modern m some spheres while keeping the
*
old values and structures in others. However, in both
interpretations
,
fascism was still regarded as a revolt
against total modernization and industrialization. In
short, there was disagreement over the intensity of the
fascist hatred for modernization and not the essence of
the fascist view toward modernization.
The view that the fascists did not merely want
to slow the pace of progress but rather wanted to turn
the clock back—to fundamentally transform society to
"happier or sounder times in the recent past""' was given
credence by many of the fascist practices and programs*
the fascist denunciation of impractical knowledge,
the fascist emphasis on war and brute force, and the
fascist theory of racial purity often supplemented by
cultural purity. Hitler's Mein Kampf and Mussolini's
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Doctrines can undoubtedly be interpreted as the writings
of those who aspire to turn back the pages of history.
The utopias envisioned by many leaders of the fascist
movement Hitler, Himmler, Rosenberg—embodied concepts
that were not only reminiscent of the days of chivalry
and chauvinism but also included myths from precivilized
times. "As remedies for the problems of the industrial
heartland of Europe in the twentieth century they pre-
scribed a revival of the cults of the soil and the
1
8
sword." Morality was to rest on non-modern ideas and
beliefs, even primitive superstitions.^
The belief by other contemporary writers that
fascism was an attempt to return to more simple times
and the order of a society long past was considered to
be an exaggeration of the fascists’ desire to demoaern-
ize. Other thi 'niters contended that fascism was merely
an ideology which sought to slow down the pace of industri-
alization to a manageable rate—not to halt it completely.
The fact that the rate of economic growth was slowed
in the twenties and thirties but not called to a virtual
standstill was often cited as evidence that the fascists
did not want to totally demodernize but merely wanted
to proceed with industrialization more cautiously and
with more restraint. It was noted that those countries
which did turn fascist were also those nations which
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entered the modernization process late as compared to
other western nations; as a result of this late entrance,
it was explained that there was more of a frantic air
within the nation—neither the people nor the govern-
ments had the necessary time to adjust properly to the
many factors involved. And thus, the modernization
process not only caused more upheavals and soul search-
ing within these countries—and in a shorter period
than in states such as Great Britain and the United
States—hut also the entire process and the changes
that ensued were also more feared in nations such as
Germany and Italy than elsewhere.
Thus, fascism was looked upon as a halfway
measure by the peoples of the nations which were attempt-
ing to proceed too rapidly; a system where old values
and traditions were exonerated by the products of
progress which were realized as necessary. In other
words, the fascists were understood as being desirous
of the products of a modern technological society while
also not wanting to disturb the agrarian community-
21
oriented structure of the pre-modern ages. Thus,
fascism was believed to have appealed to the masses
because it glorified the products of a modern industrial
society while professing the desirability of the nine-
teenth century social structure and values .
22
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Modernization and Class Conflict
The relationship of the different strata in
society to fascism and the implications of European
modernization for each segment was a basic concern
for most of the writers who identified fascism as a
"revolt against modernization." It had long been
noted that with modernization, there also came three
related societal changes* political mobilization,
social mobilization, and economic development.^ All
three changes were particularly rapid in the decade
preceeding the fascist take-over. As a result of the
rapidity and the pervasiveness of the changes, not only
did the relationship between the different social groups
change as well as their composition, but also the changes
made each group fear for its own existence as a social
class. In other words, these authors asked themselves*
Which group thought it would lose as a result of the
changes brought about by modernization; or perhaps
stated more precisely, what group or class feared modern-
ization most? Concerning this matter however, there
is little consensus among the writers themselves.
In this sense, fascism was seen as a movement
designed to exemplify the protest of certain social
classes menaced by the modernization process. As any
nation moves to the more advanced stages of modernization
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various non-raodern concepts and beliefs are threatened
by the spread of non-modern ideas. For example, the
spread of egalitarian tendencies calls into question
the authoritarian social relationships which permeate
non-modern life, i.e. democratization was an outgrowth
of industrialization in inter-wax Europe. In short,
the process of modernization creates two major conflicts!
one between the modern and the non-modern, the other
among various social classes. These conflicts were
usually believed to be most intense at the levels of
the elites? however, most scholars strongly agreed
that the conflicts were acutely felt in the lower strata
as well. Just exactly which class played the most im-
portant role in the rise of fascism—what group considered
itself most threatened by modernity—was essential to
the basis of the arguments of many of these thinkers.
For these authors therefore, the study of fascism
was part of a larger analysis of modernization and devel-
opment. Fascism, to them, represented the radical
ideology adhered to by those who, for one reason or
another, were opposed to a completely modern society.
To identify fascism as a "revolt against modernization"
was to describe it as a reaction against the advance of
industrialization and social progress. Thus, fascism
was seen not as an expression of the modern world, but
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rather as a protest against it.
The thesis that fascism was a middle class move-
ment representing protest against both capitalism and
socialism, the two roads that nations were considered
to he able to take to enter the modern world, was far
from original. As one author pointed out in the early
1900 9 st
(T)he middle class is by nature egalitarian,
democratic, and envious
. . .
(T)hey are fear-
ful above all of new economic conditions which
threatened to eliminate them, crushed between
•: the aggressive capitalism of the great companies
and the increasing rise of the working people. 25
Another wrote that fascism was "the extreme expression
of middle classism or populism. The basic ideology of
the middle class is populism,"
Thus, the argument continued, in order to find
some way out of the social and economic crisis in which
the middle class was steeped, it came to advocate pol-
itical solutions which would, in other circumstances,
have revolted them. The chaos resulting from the up-
surge of peasants nev/ly mobilized into the urban prolet-
ariat and the fear of the middle class man that he was
either to become engulfed in mass society or enslaved
by the ever powerful machine of technological advance-
ment are two arguments used to back up the notion that
fascism depicted a revolt of the middle and lower classes
27
against modernization.
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Both economic as well as psychologic factors
were seen as relevant for the rise of middle class ex-
tremism, i.e. fascism; it was viewed as the mobilization
of the disaffection of the small merchant, mechanic,
or farmer with the changes in the social and economic
environment. Over forty years ago, the social scientist
Harold Lasswell summed up the negative orientation of
the middle class to industrialization and liberalism:
Insofar as Hitlerism is a desperation reaction
of the lower middle classes, it continues a
movement which began during the closing years
of the nineteenth century, Materially speak-
ing, it is not necessary to assume that the
small shopkeepers, teachers,
, , . were v/orse
off at the end than they had been in the middle
of the century. Psychologically speaking,
however, the lower middle class was increasingly
overshadowed by the workers and the upper
bourgeoisie, whose unions, cartels, and parties
took the center of the stage. The psychological
impoverishment of the lower middle class pre-
cipitated emotional insecurities within the
personalities of its members, thus fertilizing
the ground for the various movements of mass
protest through which the middle class might
revenge themselves, 28
Thus, some of the scholars asserted that once the rela-
tive position of the middle class declined and its dis-
illusionment with contemporary trends became more
pronounced its commitment to liberal ideology changed
29from positive approval to complete disavowal.
Still, fascism was viewed by other writers who
adhered to the modernisation theme as basically the
last-ditch attempt by the elites, both modern and
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traditional, to prevent the demise of the system over
which they exercised hegemony. Due to the economic,
political and social mobilization of the middle and
lower class sectors of the population, pressure was
created to expand the state from that of an elitist
to a mass entity. This pressure was in the form of
demands made by the newly mobilized sectors of the
population-demands for a more equitable economic and
social system; demands which, if met, would substan-
tially weaken the power wielded by the elites.
Furthermore, it was often noted that the attitud-
inal changes on the part of the masses resulting from
the impact of modern political concepts was recognized
by the elites as eventually challenging the very funda-
mentals of the traditional political order. For example,
the beliefs professed and upheld by traditional reli-
gious organization was supportive to the authoritarian
political system of the non-modern society.^ This
progressive rise by the masses would allow them to
participate in the administration of a world in which
they had previously been voiceless. Certainly for the
elites, especially those of the traditional sector, it
appeared that modernism also brought with it a threat
to their own position of power and prestige. J
In the complex and sophisticated work, Three Faces
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of__Fascisrn* Ernst Nolte saw fascism net as the extreme
We 11anschauungen adhered to by one particular class of
people more than another hut rather as the ideology
aspired to by a whole people, the entire community,
because of a lurking metaphysical fear of modernization.
Nolte understood fascism to be the fundamental resistance
of an entire nation to the possibility of the elimination
of a particular reality as well as the paralyzing and
all-encompassing fear of immense changes in the super-
structure. In particular, it was the fear of universal-
ism and the transformation of the "natural relationships"—
changes which became increasingly more evident with the
advance of liberalism and modernization—that Nolte
considered to be the very essence of fascist doctrines
and powers. In contrasting traditional European life-
style to inter-was society, Nolte stated
i
Life has become too complex, the distribution
of labor too universal, for the simple pattern
of master and slave to lay any claim to valid-
ity. It is not the proofs of philosophers or
the speeches of moralists that have brought
about this world change; the power of the
hitherto sovereign groups is too great, the
violence of war too powerful,
. . .
There is
no world power left today that could effer
fundamental resistance to these changes. 34
In other words, the psychological identification
of modernism as an assault on the existing culture
manifested itself in the fascist ideology in Nolte 's
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perspective. It was this dual resistance to "oractical"
(the disengagement of traditional ties and loyalties)
and to "theoretical transcendence" (the extension of
the mind beyond what exists and to the universal), as
Nol^e called it, that was what he considered fascism to
really be,^
It has now become evident what fascism actually
is. It is not the resistance to practical
transcendence which is more or less common to
all conservative movements. It is only when
theoretical transcendence
,
from which that
transcendence originally emanated, was like-
wise denied that fascism made its appearance.
Thus fascism is at the same time resistance
to practical transcendence and struggle against
theoretical transcendence ,36
Although the controversy still continues as to
which group was most responsible for fascism or whether
the blame must rest equally on all strata of society,
the fact remains that all these scholars viewed fascism
as signifying the revolt of all those who lost—directly
or indirectly, permanently or temporarily—or who per-
ceived that they would lose, by industrialization.
Because one author believed fascism to be a revolt of
the "declasses," while another historian perceived it
to be a movement principally incited by the bourgeoisie,
while still another writer felt that fascism transcended
equally into the ranks of ail classes, is not really
of great significance. The important aspect of all
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analyses is that fascism defined as "the revolt of the
losers to modernity justly describes the basic premise
of the many variations of this over-all concern with
fascism as an outburst against modernization and the
fundamental changes which would accompany technological
advancement.
9?
CHAPTER III - NOTES
• 4.
^Allardyce
»
The Place of Fascism in European
Hi story
, p. 21, The view that fascism was a revolt
against modernization is the least developed of all
the perspectives analyzed in this thesis?* this is
probably the case due tc the relative "newness" of
this approach. This perspective is actually an out-
growth of the recent interest in modernization ana
the impact it has on a society. Modernization study
became even more popular with increased interest in'
developing nations and the anti-colonization trend
of the 60 ’s.
2Some authors such as Ernst Nolte and Wolfgang
Sauer contend that with the demise of fascism in
Europe after World War II, an end v/as brought to fas-
cism in the world as a whole. For them, fascism
was integrally related to European conditions and
the period between the two worId wars. For others
such as Barrington Moore (Social Origins of Dictator-
ship and Democracy ). Seymour Lipset ( Political Man ),
and John We i s s (The Fascist Tradi11 on j '."the future
of fascism lay in the emerging nations beyond Europe
such as Asia. Ibid
.
,
p. 23,
3The view that all the great questions and
controversies had already been settled and thus, tran-
quility would preside and political stability and
peace would ensue v/as made popular by Raymond Aron
in the middle fifties. For its full development,
see Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The
Free Press, I960).
L
Allardyce, The Place of Fascism in European
History
, p. 21.
^A, K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Pov/er in Soviet
Politics (New York* Praeger, 1962), p. 115.
°A. F. K. Organski, "Fascism and Modernization,"
in The Nature of Fascism , pp. 22-2?.
^Organski argued that the term fascist can net
properly be used in connection with Nazi Germany since
he considered Hitler *s Germany to be a fully developed
nation. The term fascist can only be used, in this
author's opinion, to describe a nation that is involved
in the shift from non-modern to modern status-’-not to
one which has a.lready completed the transition. The
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.
(New York* Alfred
A • Knopf, Inc,, 1965), chapter v
.
gContinuous strong conflict and cleavages over
a great^ number of fundamental issues together withthe lack of a strong acceptable leadership group which
these conflicts was often cited as one
of the major reasons for the downfall of the ore-
fascist regimes. These conflicts, the circumstances
of which were recognized as varying from one nation
to another, were also usually connected with economic
turmoil. The lack of consensus and lack of any clear
policy as to how to deal with these conflicts led,
in time, to the acceptance of extreme solutions, an
example of which was fascism. S. N. Eisenstadt,
"Breakdowns of Modernization, " Economic Development
and Cultural Change
. XII (July, 1964)
, 349-50 .
9
'Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialismi Totali-
tarianism or Fascism?," American Historical Review .
LXXIII, no. 2 (December, 196?), 419-20.
^Organski, "Fascism and Modernization," p. 22.
11It was often stated that fascism never gained
wide acclaim in fully industrialized powers such as
Britain because the English had already successfully
completed the cycle during which fascism could become
a popular movement. Furthermore, fascism was said to
be unable to flourish in backward societies such as
that which existed in Russia because industrialization
had not yet reached the point in the modernization
process necessary for the entrenchment of fascist
sentiments
.
12Barrington Moore, Jr, Social Origins of Dictator-
ship and Democracy (Boston* Beacon Press, 1966), pp.
VW-3S'.
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David Schoenbaum, Hitler’s Social Revolution*
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Doubleday & Co., 1966 ), p. xiv.
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XXIV (July, 1972), 550 .
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Itiid
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.
p. 551,
19Social scientists J. P. Nettle and Roland
Robertson seated tnat nations such as Nazi Germany
were not modernizing nations because firstly, they
not seek power and prestige on terms recognizedby the overwhelming majority of other nations,
. .
.»
and. secondly
,
"
-hey deliberately espoused traditional-istic values . " International Systems and the Modern-
l.zati.on of_S_ocieties (London": Faber & Faber, 196$)
,
p. 48, footnote i. These authors' conception of modern-ization was as follows: "Modernization is the process
whereby national elites seek successfully to reduce
their atomic status and move toward equivalence with
other 'well-placed* nations. The goal of equivalence
is not a fixed one but a moving 'target'; and the
perception of it will depend both on the values and
exigencies in the international system and on the
values, dispositions and capabilities of the nation
in question, as exDerienced by national elites,”
PP. 56-57.
20For the annual rate of growth in industrial
output during the inter-war period as compared to the
periods before the First World War and after the
Second World War, see Surendra J. Patel, "Rates of
Industrial Growth in the Last Century, 1860-1958,”
Economic Development and Cultural Change , IX (April,
19617, 316-351, especially Table 2 on p. 319,
21Turner, "Fascism and Modernization," p. 557
•
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"... (T)he Nazis accorded to the products
of industry, such as automobiles, airplanes, tanks and
other modern weapons
,
a curious sort of autonomy, view-
ing them largely in isolation from the social, economic,
and political concomitants of the processes that made
them possible," Ibid
.
22
^Organski, "Fascism and Modernization," p. 23.
^Ibid
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, pp, 24-31.
^Andre Siegfried, Tableau Politique de la France
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Armand Colin, 1913), p. Cited in Seymour Martin
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^David J, Saposs, “The Role of the Middle Classm Social Development* Fascism, Populism, Communism,
Socialism," in Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Cl air
Mitchell (New York* Columbia" University Press! 1933)
P. 395.
7
27The arguments centering on the psychological
aspects of modernization such as the two mentioned here
are particularly focused on in the brilliant and complex
work by Ernst Noite, Three Faces of Fascism , trans.
Leila Vennewitz (New York: Hoit, Rinehart, & Winston,
1966 ),
28
'
'Harold Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism,"
The Political Quarterly , IV (1933), 374,
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In his book, The Fascist Tradition (New York»
Harper & Row, Inc,, 196?), John Weiss contended that
there was no such person as a liberal man in the true
sense of the term in the nineteenth century,
30Organski
,
"Fascism and Modernization," p, 24,
31For example, the demand for more democratic
practices would increase the power of the middle class
at the expense of the traditional elitist sector of
society,
32J Organski f "Fascism and Modernization," p, 26.
33
The theory that fascist movements were subser-
vient to elitist needs regardless of the social back-
ground of its adherents and leaders has come to dominate
the literature of the sixties. For example, although
Moore was very concerned about the peasants’ position
vis-a-vis modernization, he also believed that where
traditional and aristocratic attitudes prevailed over
bourgeois attitudes in the advance toward modernisation,
the way to fascism had been paved,
^4Noite, Three Faces of Fascism , p, 423.
^Theoretical transcendence as defined by Noite
is "the reaching out of the mind beyond v/hat exists and
what can exist toward an absolute whole , , , " Practi-
cal transcendence is "the social process, even its
_
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ships, thereby rendering them in general more subtleand more abstract the process which disengages theindivj. aual -rora traditional ties and increases thepower of the group until it finally assails even theprimordial forces of nature and history." Ibid., p.
36md.. p. 1*53.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis was primarily devoted to an analysis
of three different perspectives on fascism—fascism
viewed as the "end of liberalism," fascism viewed as
"totalitarianism," fascism viewed as the "revolt against
modernization"—which, in spite of certain similarities
regarding conceptual biases and the fact that all aim
at a comprehensive theory to account for fascism's
broad appeal, emphasized different aspects of "fastoid"
thought and behavior. Consequently, the conclusions
usually arrived at by these three views were neither
contradictory nor the same. Since most of the liter-
ature to date on fascism has shared characteristics and
may be identified to a significant degree as belonging
to one of the three approaches on fascism, problems
are not only evident within the different perspectives
on fascism but also in the body of work on fascism as
a whole.
Taking the intellectual study of fascism in its
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entirety, two major pitfalls can "be observed: 1) the
writer often imposed on his subject an order, a ration-
ality, a theoretical sophistication which, in actuality,
fascism did not possess, and 2) fascism has usually
been studied as a movement without stages, a movement
with few changes, a movement that professed one ideology
in 1919 and clung to that same set of beliefs and prac-
tices until itta demise—lit ole attention has been drawn
to the shifts in character that occured as fascism as
an ideological construct changed to that of a viable
political system and then, in some instances, such as
those of Italy and Germany, changed to the actual
regime in power.
Concerning the first observation or bias in the
collection of ’writings on fascism—the temptation to
see more than what is, to rationalize or to explain
more than can be rationalized or explained--this is
a common problem in analyzing phenomena that do not
readily yield to the conventional rational analysis of
theory or practice. More than in most other phenomena,
there are unconcious and irrational influences in fascism
which can not be explained or rationalized. Consider-
ation must be given to national hubris, chauvanistic
national ideological bent, familial religious beliefs,
and many other factors existing in the political soil
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of the nation into which the seed of fascism must be
planted in order to grow. As one theorist wrote:
"(T)he fascist philosophy was no doubt a vulgarization
and a caricature, but like all caricatures it resembled
o
something real,”
The pitfall of giving fascism an ideological or
practical coherence not really evident in the theory
or the movement itself was emphasized by another theorist
in his observations about contemporary political theori-
zation:
It was left to the twentieth century to do some-
thing more drastic than this. For the first
time it was now conceived that the most effective
way of dealing with questions, particularly those
recurrent issues which had perplexed and often
tormented original and honest minds in every
generation, was not by employing the tools
of reason, still less those of the more myster-
ious capacities called "insight" and "intuition"
but by obliterating the questions themselves.
3
This is not to say that fascism should not be
studied rationally or that it lacks any intellectual
origins or that it is not a worthy academic endeavor.
Rather, it is to say that since fascism is an ideology
and a movement of a particular nature having an essence
or core partly irrational or unexplainable, future
writers must be careful not to distort the fascist
phenomenon for the purpose of making the study accept-
able in terms of rationality. This practice has rendered
a great many works on fascism biased and mislea.ding.
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The foregoing observation applies equally to all three
perspectives on fascism.
In the view that fascism was the revolt by a lib-
eral society against its own liberal tenets, certain
goals and beliefs were emphasized that were particularly
anti-liberal in tone such as fascism's disavowal that
man has any natural rights on which the state is not
allowed to transgress, or the fascists' conception
that outside the state man is a non-entity. Thus, it
was logically adduced that since some fascist sentiment
was particularly anti-liberal and anti-democratic and
since fascism was fast becoming a movement of the masses,
fascism was essentially the changing of one type of
society, liberal, for another, conservative, i.e. fascist.
This same emphasis on goals and tenets coupled
with an interest in a different aspect of the social,
economic, and political development—the period of
modernization—allowed later scholars to use the same
bases (the aspirations, slogans, and writings of fascist
leaders) to rationalize it as being not primarily a
revolt against liberal society but rather a revolt against
modernization. The fact that many fascist leaders them-
selves spoke about the great virtues which were present
in the past—but not in their century--was of particular
use to those who wrote that fascism was an attempt to
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turn the clock back.
The fact that both Stalin and Hitler employed
practices equally perverse and inhuman and were able
to weld thought and manpower together through the use
of demogogary, rhetoric, and personal charisma made
it possible for still others to pronounce fascism and
communism brother movements. An emphasis on the total-
ltarian features of both regimes allowed many to conclude
that the ideological differences between fascism and
communism were insignificant ; both movements should be
assessed by what they do and not by what they say.
The error of viewing fascism as a movement pri-
marily designated for one logical end, or emphasizing
one aspect in order to rationally or logically explain
fascism's existence and support by the masses has often
imposed on fascism an essence which is essentially false
to its true character. Factuality or truth has often
been sacrificed for coherence and logical deduction.
An insensitivity to the changes in the character
of fascism as it progressed from one stage to another
is also evident in contemporary as well as historical
works. "Much that seems puzzling about the relation
betv/een ideas and ideologies and organized political
groups
. . ,
disappear (s) with the simple acknowledgment
that each of the three stages (ideological construct,
10?
organized movement, ruling party) poses different require-
ments and ivhus, fascism as first conceived as a prag-
matic goal is different from fascism as a ruling ideology
.
4
In short, certain deductions or rational explanations
may be applicable to one stage of fascism's development
but not to another. By correctly identifying the stages '
through which fascism must pass with the platforms and
practices as well as the social and economic environ-
ments of each stage, a more accurate assessment of fas-
cism's meanings can be had.
Again, although those writing during fascism's
early beginnings were only able to view it in its first
stage and therefore can not be faulted, most other
scholars writing later failed to recognize that the
stage in which the movement began—that on which they
were concentrating—had a great impact on determining
how they perceived the essence of the movement itself.
Fascism viewed as the antithesis of liberalism—a per-
spective held by those writing in the twenties and
early thirties—might best describe fascism in the stage
when it v/as simply more of an ideological construct
than a viable political system; while fascism viewed
as totalitarianism might be more applicable to the
period when fascists were trying to enlarge the move-
ment and secure the actual governmental apparatus. The
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stage of the movement that one is concentrating on will
have a marked influence over one's over-all conception
of fascism.
In analyzing the three perspectives on fascism,
it becomes evident that each approach has merits and
failings which are unique to each point of view. Need-
less to say, the study has always been influenced by
the perspective just as the perspective is influenced
by the realities.
According to the "end of liberalism" view, that
approach taken by the majority of writers in the twenties
and thirties, fascism is the breakdown of the social
and economic order that had evolved out of the sixteenth
century, the passing of a system characterized by out-
moded liberal ideas. In effect, the rise of fascism
was seen as the disinheritance of the liberal and social-
ist thoughts and practices of the nineteenth century.
In this view, western Europe, or at least by
implication those nations which later turned fascist,
was considered as leaning toward liberal sentiments and
liberal government before the fascist take-over. In
short, to see fascism as the revolt against or as the
end of the liberal system is to see pre-fascist rule
as liberal in ideology and practice. Something can
not be revolted against or concluded without its having
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existed. It presupposes pre-fascist European society
and government to be of the liberal variety.
In the case of Italy, Germany, and even Spain,
it may be questioned whether liberal sentiments were
the dominant mood of the people or liberal doctrines
the beliefs on which the governmental structures were
erected. A glance at the historical data of those
countries which became fascist shows that conservative,
and even authoritarian governments, though they fell
far short of fascism, fell equally distant from liberal-
ism. It was these very same governments, conservative
in essence, which dominated the lives of most of the
people who lived in those entities which were later to
become fascist.
Although these authoritarian regimes did aquire
some democratic features, i.e. a parliament with limited
powers, and although their history is punctuated with
attempts to become democratic, attempts which, toward
the end, succeeded in establishing unstable and super-
ficial democracies (the Weimar Republic in Germany,
Italy under Giolitti), these states were by no means
permeated by liberal sentiments and aims nor v/ere they
dominated by democratic processes to the extent implied
in the "end of liberalism" view. In speaking of
Weimar Germany, David Schoenbaum states
i
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The disaffection was structural, endemic in allWestern industrial societies, but intensified“in
Germany by special historical factors: a non-
competitive, highly concentrated, highly-pricedindustrial economy, the disproportionate influence
of a small class of large landowners, a high
birthrate until World War I, too many rural small-holders, an inflated urban petite bourgeoisie.
All of these had been built into Bismark's Reich.
5
And another author stated: "Italy and Germany had no
sufficient experience of freedom, therefore they crushed
it,"^ Thus, to describe fascism as liberalism grown
defiant gives too much credit to the strength of lib-
eral convictions in inter-war Germany and Italy, Both
countries remained essentially conservative and authori-
tarian both before and after the fascist take-over; such
conditions were in fact accentuated by the new regime.
Others remarked that since World War I, there were not
many convinced adherents of liberalism in western Europe;
however, when were there ever many?
Another problem with the "end of liberalism" view
is that it fails to answer the question; if disaffection
with democracy and liberalism is the major impetus behind
fascism, why did some liberal entities embrace fascism
while others were repelled and opposed such evident in-
sanity? It appears that those nations which were only
superficially liberal, or those involved in the trans-
ition from monarchical to liberal philosophies, became
fascist while the great democracies of the century such
Ill
Great Britain and the United States—those nations con-
structed on essentially liberal tenets—remained primar-
ily liberal throughout the fascist crisis. Fascism may
be seen as more of an outgrowth of this conservatism
rather than a result of superficial liberalism. Thus,
it can be said that conservatism and not liberalism
bred fascism
Although the validity of perceiving inter-war
European fascism as an outgrowth of a destructive nine-
teenth century liberal society is questionable on several
counts, fascism viewed as the antithesis of a liberal
democratic society is nevertheless a valid and useful
comparison. The fact that liberalism represents certain
ideas in the minds of most social scientists: individ-
ualism, small government, freedom of competition, etc.,
while fascism connotes others: collectivism, big govern-
ment, state-controlled enterprises, etc., fascism thus
compared becomes more readily understood. Therefore,
it is not incorrect to state that fascism is opposed
to liberalism, and erroneous to infer that the former
is an outgrowth of the latter.
In the thirties and forties, the prevalent inter-
pretation of fascism by most scholars was that of "total-
itarianism," Fascism, and Nazism in particular, now
appeared to be one form, similar to communism, of a more
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general disease of modern society. To writers such as
Hannah Arendt and Carl J. Friedrich, the emphasis on the
omnipotence and monolithic structure of fascist and
communist regimes as well as similarities in the relation-
ships between their practices and the employment of
terror tactics as a means of subjugating opponents
made these two ideologies appear to be manifestations
of the same thing: totalitarianism.
In the early fifties with Khrushchev's anti-
Stalinist and co-existence policies, the belief that
fascism and communism were similar generic phenomena
began fading into the past. To be sure, totalitarian
theory can not be dismissed entirely. As Ernst Nolte
stated: "Possibly bolshevism at a certain stage could
be called fascism and fascism in its entirety Bolshevism."^
Modern dictatorships have certainly developed new char-
acteristics and totalitarianism is one of them. However,
it is not as important as totalitarian theory has main-
tained. Although the two manifestations showed consider-
able similarities, such similarities did not derive from
the same situation nor did they originate from comparable
theories. Furthermore, the goals professed by the
two regimes were alike in neither substance nor theory.
In effect, the difference between communism and fascism
is not merely one of semantics.
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Communism is based on Marxism-Leninism's material-
ist interpretation of history with its emphasis on
economic factors in determining the nature of a society.
Class struggle is considered the motivating force in
social evolution and the state is considered to be the
instrument of class power and domination. By contrast,
the theory of fascism is confused and ambivalent for
its theore uical and intellectual background is meager
compared to the sophisticated analyses of Marx. Fascism
believes that all actions should be influenced by heroic
motives and that economic considerations should have
no affect on the individual's motivations. Probably
above all else, fascism denies that class war can be
the preponderant force in the transformation of a society.
Furthermore, in disagreement with the teachings
of fascism, communism believes in the perfectibility
of all mankind. Only political, social, and economic
factors (with an emphasis on the economic) prevent man
from realizing his true potential both as a social and
productive being. In fascist doctrine, it is only by
man's subjugation to the state that he is able to realize
the utmost limits of his capabilities.
Thus, in their inception and in some of their
very basic premises, fascism and communism are antitheti-
cal. In comparing fascism to communism, one author wrote:
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Even the^ Dictatorship of the Proletariat" is
superficially similar to Fascism onlv in some
tia??v
S political structure
,
but essen-lly different m its philosophic accroachto the solution of mankind’s problems, in the
economic structure and social fabric of its
society, in its declared goal and at least in
some of the ways it hopes to achieve it. Lastbut by no means least, it differs in its mate-
rial, moral, psychological, and intellectual
appeal to individuals and nations the world
over .
8
The purported ends of communism and fascism, then,
are totally different from each other. While the former
main beans
-hat a dictatorship would be but a preparation
for a pure communist state, that is one in which a
coercive force does not exist, the latter rules that
the state is not only the present but also the future.
For fascism, rule by one man is the final goal; fascism
has no other end.
In sum, the concentration on the similarities
between fascism and communism has led to the erroneous
conclusion that communism and fascism are brother move-
ments. In effect, the "totalitarian" approach has
probably obscured and set back the study of fascism as
much as it has illuminated and added to this fielf of
inquiry. The fact is that communism and fascism are
not but two strands of poison ivy and fundamental,
basic differences do exist between their origins, ten-
ets, and goals. These differences must be recognized
and evaluated for a realistic and valid understanding
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of the nature of fascism.
Another unfortunate result of employing the total-
itarian perspective is the emergence of a striking over-
emphasis on National Socialism and the neglect of other
types of fascism, i.e. Italian—varieties that were less
"total" and therefore, less inhumane. In the view that
communism and fascism are similar phenomena, it is
usually Nazism rather than fascism as a whole that is
compared and declared similar in essence to Stalin's
communism. Little attention is paid to the fact that
Nazism was only one form of fascism and Stalinism was
Marxism-Leninism in a bastardized form. Thus, the
"totalitarian" approach not only neglects essential
differences between fascist and communist ideologies, but
also ignores the study of fascism as a whole--a European
movement—in favor of the study of one particular type
of fascism, Nazism,
The "revolt against modernization" approach is
undoubtedly the perspective most employed by contemporary
political scientists. In this view, fascism is seen as
that radical ideology adhered to during a critical period
in one stage of the West's development—that phase when
a society is neither a modern or an industrialized entity
nor a traditional, agrarian state. Thus, fascism was
seen as the predominant mass philosophy which prevailed
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during a period of transition, a time of unrest and un-
certainties. It should be noted that extreme ideologies
are believed to prevail when the basic structures and
traditional relationships in a society are undergoing
vast changes and the citizens, as a result of such trans-
formations, are fearful for their own existence and
fate and thus, susceptible to ideologies that purport
to bring stability and order back.
The prevalent argument made against this per-
spective is that to say that fascism is a "revolt against
modernization" is to imply that fascism is anti-modern
in the tenets it espoused and the practices it employed.
Critics of this view argue that under fascist rule,
technology was actually deified and the pace of industrial-
ization and technological advancement, although slowed
in some spheres, were actually accelerated in others.
Thus, how can one state that fascism is a revolt against
the very conditions
—
progress and development—that in
many areas it was actually aiding to expand?
This criticism may be answered by keeping in mind
that fascism is essentially pragmatic and therefore,
although it may oppose modernization in theory, it may
not be against advancement in those areas in which it
would be disadvantageous to do so, i.e, intensive research
for the development and the manufacture of weapons for
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the military. Thus, fascism may he seen as being anti-
modern in essence while being technologically oriented
in practice, .ascism, like many other political phil-
osophies, often purports to be of one nature and appeals
to its followers Decause of that nature while, in actuality,
it may often represent exactly the opposite. This was
the case with the fascist ideology—the masses believed
that fascism wras the total rejection of modernization
while its leaders refuted only so much as suited their
purposes
.
Undoubtedly the best argument for the anti-modern-
ization approach is that those nations which have turned
fascist since the Second World War, i.e. Ghana, Chile,
are involved in transforming their societies from a
pre-industrial, traditional entity to a technological,
modern state, and therefore, they find themselves in
much the same type of situation as that of the inter-war
European nations. Since both past and present fascist
states may be said to have been at some initial stage
of the modernization process during the period in which
fascism flourished, fascism certainly may be a likely
ideology to be espoused by an emerging nation during
the difficult transitory period of industrialization.
However, regardless of the problems evident in
the different views on fascism, the importance of each
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perspective rests in its ability to examine, point out,
and delineate certain characteristics of fascism and
to compare such features to those of other political
systems and philosophies. In the M end of liberalism"
view and the "totalitarian" view, fascism is compared
to two particular systems of government, the liberal
system and the communist system respectively and the
theories on which they are built. The "revolt against
modernization" view perceives fascism as the result of
the clash between anti-modern and modern philosophies
and ways of life.
Even though legal responsibility for the growth
of a fascist society probably must be borne by a relative-
ly few individuals, all three perspectives perceive fas-
cism as being an ultimate creation of human beings and
not as a phenomenon arising beyond the ken of mankind
and therefore, one from which mankind can disassociate
itself, pleading lack of foresight, lack of knowledge,
or the inability to realize the ultimate consequences
so inherently ruinous to themselves. Only when fascism
is recognized as such, can it be prevented.
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